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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Was the covenant not to compete contained in the contract between Keene Corp.
and Larry Benson valid and binding?
This is a question of law, and therefore this Court should address this issue de novo:

Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).
II.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by refusing to modify its original
preliminary injunction against Larry Benson to extend an additional six months?
"[T]he granting or refusing of injunction rests to some extent within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its judgment . . . will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it can be said the court abused its discretion, or that the
judgment rendered is clearly against the weight of the evidence."

Systems Concept Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983). Modification of an order of
injunction should not be made unless "the circumstances, whether of law or facts, obtaining
at the time of issuance have changed, or new ones have since arisen." Systems Federation
No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
III.

Did the District Court Abuse its Discretion by Refusing to Enjoin Connie Benson
and Robert Benson (Who Were Not Parties to Larry Benson's Employment
Agreement With Kasco) From Competing with Kasco?
The standard of review for the refusal of injunctive relief identified for issue II above

also applies to issue III.
IV.

Can Kasco Be Afforded Injunctive Relief Even Though The Period of NonCompetition Covered By The Agreement Between Larry Benson and Keene
Has Lapsed?
This is a new issue not raised by Kasco at the District Court Level or in their

Petition for Interlocutory Appeal.

1

V.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by refusing leave to amend Kasco's
Verified Complaint to add Robert Benson as a defendant and to add claims against
Larry and Connie Benson over a year after the Verified Complaint was first filed?

A trial court's refusal of leave to amend pleadings is reviewed for abuse of discretion
Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1199, 1150 (Utah App. 1987).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY
PROVISIONS OR RULES
Rule 5(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory order may
be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal from the
interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over
the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court, with
proof of service on all other parties to the action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case
This is an interlocutory appeal from the district court's refusal to modify its

preliminary injunction against Larry Benson, its refusal for the second time to enjoin Connie
Benson, its refusal to enjoin Robert Benson and its refusal to allow Kasco to amend its
Compliant, over a year after the Verified Complaint was filed, to add new parties and new
causes of action.
2.

Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition
On March 17, 1989, Kasco filed a Verified Complaint against Larry Benson, his wife

Connie Benson, and Tri-B Supply seeking injunctive relief and damages. On the same
2

date, the district court entered a temporary restraining order against the defendants. On
March 21, 1989, following a hearing, the district court granted a preliminary injunction
solely against Larry Benson. The district court signed an order of preliminary injunction
on April 10, 1989.

Subsequently, Kasco filed the following motions (1) Motion for

Preliminary Injunction Against Connie Benson and Order to Show Cause Why Connie
Benson Should Not Be Held In Contempt Of Court, dated April 17, 1989; (2) Motion for
Leave to Amend Complaint, dated August 24, 1989; (3) Motion for Preliminary Injunction
against Robert Benson, dated January 5, 1990; and (4) Motion for Modification of the
Court's April 7, 1989, Order of Preliminary Injunction, dated January 17, 1990. The district
court denied Kasco's motions after a hearing.
Kasco filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order on May 29,1990.
This Court granted Kasco's petition on July 17, 1990. On June 20, 1990 Kasco filed a
Motion for Injunction Pending Disposition of Petition Under Rule 5 and Pending Appeal.
On August 14, 1990 this Court granted Kasco's motion.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
In addition to the facts set forth in Kasco's Petition, the following facts are necessary
for consideration of this Petition for Interlocutory Appeal:
1. Prior to 1977, Larry Benson worked for Grandma's Cookies. Larry Benson
traveled to various grocery stores and developed relationships with the store managers.
Many of the stores he visited for Grandma's Cookies were the same as those he serviced
as an employee of Keene. (Larry Benson Deposition, Page 272-274).1

1

A copy of the cited pages is included as Exhibit A.
3

2. Larry Benson was hired by Keene Corporation in 1977 and continued to work
for them until they were merged into Kasco Services Corporation (MKasco") in 1983.
(Kasco's Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, Page 2, Paragraph 2,
hereafter "Petition").
3.

Larry Benson signed a non-competition agreement with Keene in 1982,

approximately five years after he began working for Keene. (Petition, Page 4, Paragraph
3).
4. The only position Larry Benson ever held with Keene or Kasco was salesman.
5. In 1987, Connie Benson and Larry Benson received a Tax Identification Number
for Tri-B-Supply Company. Tri-B-Supply Company originally sold ceramics only. (Connie
Benson Deposition, Page 80).2
6. In January, 1989, Connie Benson became concerned about obtaining a business
license because of the increased traffic coming to her home.

Larry Benson, whose

employment with Kasco, was experiencing some difficulty, believed it prudent to include
the sale of butcher supplies as part of the newly acquired Tri-B-Supply business license.
At that point, no decision had been made as to Larry Benson leaving Kasco's employment
or setting up any kind of competing business. (Larry Benson Affidavit, Paragraph 2).3 (R.
822, para. 2).
7. Approximately one week before Larry Benson gave notice of his intent to exercise
his option to resign and terminate the employment contract, Larry Benson became so
dissatisfied with his employment at Kasco that he believed that he had no alternative but

2
3

A copy of the cited pages is included as Exhibit B.
A copy of Larry Benson's Affidavit is included as Exhibit C.
4

to voice his intent to leave the business. He believes that was the first time he indicated
to any customers that he was leaving Kasco. He stated nothing about starting a competing
business, only that he was leaving Kasco's employment. (R. 823, para, 3, 4).
8. During the time when he voiced his intent to leave Kasco's employment, Larry
Benson's hope was that Kasco would contact him and work something out so that he could
stay. Therefore, he was careful not to do or say anything which would alienate the
customers which he hoped would remain with him at Kasco after something was worked
out between Kasco and himself for his continued employment. (R. 823, para. 3).
9. When Kasco would not even return Larry Benson's calls and made no attempt
to work with him with regard to his employment concern^, Larry Benson tendered his
resignation, dated February 15, 1989, effective March 1, 1989. (R. 823, para. 3, 5).
10. On March 10, 1989, prior to the Restraining Order, Connie Benson sent a letter
to potential customers, who she found in the telephone book and through store rosters,
informing them that Tri-B-Supply was beginning a butcher supply business. (Connie Benson
Affidavit, Paragraph 4).4 (R. 819, para. 4).
11. The March 10, 1989 letter referred to in Paragraph 9 of Kasco's Statement of
Facts as set forth in its Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order was sent to
all potential customers of Tri-B-Supply Company and not merely those formerly serviced
by Kasco. (Connie Benson Deposition, Pages 42-43).
12. Kasco asserts that after this letter, Kasco customers requested Kasco remove
its equipment.

Connie Benson specifically disputes that this occurred and personally

contacted those companies which Plaintiff asserts requested equipment to be removed and

4

A copy of Connie Benson's Affidavit is included as Exhibit D.
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found that persons making those requests were not authorized to make statements in behalf
of the companies. The various meat cutters in stores would not be able to operate if the
equipment were removed and therefore would not be in a position to ask for equipment
to be removed prior to having substituted equipment placed in their stores. The substitute
equipment was not placed in the stores by Tri-B-Supply or Connie Benson. (Petition,
Paragraph 9, Page 7) (R. 819, para. 5).
13. On March 18, 1989, a Temporary Restraining Order was filed against Connie
and Larry Benson. (R. 85-95).
14. On March 21, 1989, Preliminary Injunction was entered against Larry Benson
only. The Court's Order enjoined him from competing with Kasco for 18 months from
the time it determined the agreement was terminated, August of 1988. Pursuant to the
Court's ruling, non-competition provision would terminate in March of 1990 instead of
September of 1990 as claimed by Kasco.5 (R. 973).
15. The Preliminary Injunction was signed on April 10, 1989. (R. 141).
16. The Court found that it had no jurisdiction to enter a restraining order on
Connie Benson. (March 21, 1989 Transcript of Judge's Ruling Page 9). (R. 973, p. 9).
17. After the Restraining Order was entered, all orders for butcher supplies were
made by Connie Benson. At all times, invoices for orders made by Tri-B-Supply were
paid for by Connie Benson, with checks written by her. (R. 818, para. 3).
18. At the time the Preliminary Injunction was issued, Larry Benson's interest in
Tri-B-Supply was terminated. Since that date, Larry Benson has had no input in the

5

A copy of the March 21, 1989 Transcript of Judge's Ruling is included as Exhibit E.
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butcher supply business nor does he share in the profits, to the extent any exist, of Tri-BSupply. (R. 819, para. 7).
19. After the Preliminary Injunction, only Connie Benson was authorized by the
bank to sign checks. (R. 818, para. 3).
20. Since the Preliminary Injunction of March 21, 1989, Larry Benson has done
nothing to be involved with Tri-B-Supply butcher supply business although he has been
actively involved in marketing ceramics. (R. 823-824, para. 9, 10).
21. In order to get established in the business, Connie Benson was required to be
trained. She traveled with Robert Benson to Denver, to Huwa Sales and Service where
they were trained by Dan Huwa. Connie Benson personally paid for the training. (R. 819820, para. 8).
22. Connie Benson received information on pricing by discussing the matter with
suppliers to determine what her mark-up should be as well as from Dan Huwa.
(Deposition of Connie Benson P. 34). (R. 820, para. 7).
23. In order to prevent any confusion that Larry Benson might still be in the
business, Connie Benson caused to be sent out to all potential customers, a letter stating
that Larry Benson had been restrained and that he would not be involved in Tri-B-Supply's
business and that she and Robert Benson would be operating Tri-B-Supply.6 (R. 820), para.
9).
24. Connie Benson also had Anna Benson answer the telephone for the business
so that Larry Benson would not even have to be involved in answering the telephone.
Although Larry was present in the building to continue the ceramics supply business, Larry

6

A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit F.
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had no responsibility to answer the telephone and he only did this when Anna Benson or
Connie Benson were not available to do so, such as times when they were out to get the
mail. On the occasions that Larry answered the telephone he would merely take messages
for Connie and Robert to return. (R. 823-824, para. 9, 10).
25. In the hearing of March 21, 1989, Judge Young indicated the following acts
would be a violation of his order of injunction against Larry Benson.
1. Larry Benson communicating or sharing any information that he
would have received as an employee of Keene or Kasco with Connie Benson.
(R. 973, p. 7).
2. Any "assistance, communication, contact, conversation, whatever
else it may be, with Mrs. Benson . . ." not in harmony with the spirit of the
covenant not to compete. (R. 973, p. 8).
26. On April 5, 1990, the Honorable Judge David S. Young, ruling on Kasco's
Motions found that Larry Benson had abided by the terms of the Preliminary Injunction.
The court found that Larry did not assist or aid Connie or Robert in their operation of TriB Supply. (April 5, 1990 Transcript of Judge's Ruling, Page 3).7 (R. 971, p. 3).
27. On May 1, 1989, Larry Benson underwent surgery to remove the L-5 disk from
his back because of severe nerve damage and disk degeneration. From that date until the
present, he has been totally disabled. The doctors have indicated to him that he is in need
of another operation but they have chosen not to operate to remove scar tissue because it
is too close to the nerve and an operation may render him paralyzed. (R. 824, para. 12).

7

A copy of the April 5, 1990 Transcript of Judge's Ruling is attached hereto as Exhibit

G.
8

28. At this point, Larry Benson is not even able to participate in therapy and has
been receiving periodic epidural injections of steroids and cortisone. From that time to
the present, Larry Benson has been totally unable to work. (R. 824, para. 12).
29. Robert Benson lives in his own household and began working at Tri-B-Supply
to help Connie Benson after Larry was restrained. He has had no communication with
Larry regarding the butcher supply business or Tri-B-Supply. All the information he has
obtained has been from on the job training or from training received through Huwa Sales
and Service. Robert Benson is an employee of Tri-B-Supply and has no ownership interest
whatsoever in the company. (Robert Benson Affidavit, Paragraph 2-12).8 (R. 422-423, para.
2-12).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Kasco's appeal of the orders granting preliminary injunctive relief against Larry
Benson and denying the same against Connie Benson are untimely and should therefore be
dismissed.
Those motions and the motions seeking to enjoin Robert Benson and to amend
Kasco's Complaint should be denied in that the restrictive covenant which is the basis for
all of Kasco's claims is invalid in that it was not supported by consideration and Larry
Benson's services were neither special, unique, or extraordinary.
Kasco's motions seeking injunctive relief should also be denied because Kasco is not
suffering an irreparable harm and the equities clearly demonstrate the harm suffered by the
defendants, if such relief were granted, would be far greater than that suffered by Kasco,
if it is not.
8

A copy of Robert Benson's Affidavit is attached as Exhibit H.
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Finally, the motion to amend the Complaint should be denied in that allowing Kasco
to amend will result in severe prejudice to the Defendants, and Robert Benson is not
properly a party in this suit.
ARGUMENT
Overview
The district court did not make any findings of facts or conclusions of law in denying
the motions being appealed here. The standard of review for an interlocutory order where
findings of fact are not made is set forth in Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224
(1952).
Reviewing a case of this kind where issues of fact are involved and there are
no findings of fact, we do not review the facts but assume that the trier of the
facts found them in accord with its decision, and we affirm the decision if
from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it.
Id. at 245 P.2d 226. See also Mohave Uranium Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 451 P.2d 587,
591 n. 7 (Utah 1969).
The facts in this case clearly support the findings of the trial court and therefore
the Plaintiffs Interlocutory Appeal should be denied.

I.

KASCO'S PETITION IS UNTIMELY AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE
DENIED.
Kasco would have this Court believe that it is appealing the Trial Court's Order of

May 9, 1990 denying Kasco's Motion for Modification of the April 7, 1989 Order
Preliminary Injunction and Kasco's Motion For Preliminary Injunction Against Connie
Benson and Order to Show Cause Why Connie Benson Should Not Be Held in Contempt
of Court. In reality, Kasco is asking this Court to reverse the Order of the Trial Court of
10

March 21, 1989. It was on March 21, 1989 that the Trial Court ruled the Non-Competition
Agreement was to be valid from August of 1988 for eighteen months for purposes of the
Preliminary Injunction and that Connie Benson should not be enjoined. (R. 973). Kasco
failed to appeal the Trial Court's Order, instead it filed its subsequent barrage of motions.
Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a party to appeal an
interlocutory order "within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court..." Kasco
did not appeal the April 10, 1989 order within 20 days instead it brought subsequent
motions to the trial court containing the same arguments as previously heard and rejected.
To allow Kasco to have its motions for injunctive relief heard by this court is to
make the time restriction contained in Rule 5 moot and allow an interlocutory order to be
appealed indefinitely by simply bringing the identical motion at a later date.
Kasco's appeal of the order denying the injunctive relief as against Tri-B Supply
and Connie Benson and granting injunctive relief against Larry Benson is not timely and
should therefore be dismissed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION TO DENY KASCO'S MOTIONS WAS
CORRECT.
A.

Kasco's Motion to Modify the Preliminary Injunction Against Larry Benson
was Properly Denied by the Trial Court.

Ordinarily the issuing of an injunction is not appealable.
Injunction, being an extraordinary remedy, should not be lightly granted, and
it is well settled that: the granting or refusing of injunction rests to some
extent within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its judgment. . . will
not be disturbed on appeal unless it can be said the court abused its
discretion or that the judgment entered is clearly against the weight of the
evidence.
Systems Concept Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983).
11

1. A Court should not modify an injunction absent a change in circumstances
or fact.
The conditions under which a court should modify an injunction were addressed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Systems Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642. In Systems
Federation, the court was faced with a motion to modify an injunction entered by a trial
court which forbade discrimination against non-union employees by the Louisville and
Nashville Railroads. The statute upon which the injunction was originally entered was
modified by an act of Congress.
In the court's opinion, Justice Harlan stated the proposition that a court will not
modify injunctive relief on the basis of a reconsideration of matters which have already
been adjudicated.

The Court stated that "[fjirmness and stability must no doubt be

attributed to continuing injunctive relief based on adjudicated facts and law, and neither the
[opposing party] nor the court should be subjected to the unnecessary burden or reestablishing what has once been decided." Id. at 647.
Justice Harlan did, however, indicate that modification of the injunction would be
appropriate in two situations; a change in the law or a change in the facts. Id.9 He said that
"sound judicial discretion may call for the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree
if the circumstances, whether of law or facts, obtaining at the time of its issuance have
changed, or new ones have since arisen." Id. (emphasis added).
Because Kasco's appeal attempts to modify the Preliminary Injunction based on a
re-adjudication of when the starting period of the injunction should commence, and is not

9

(A footnote does suggest that other equitable grounds may exist for changing an
order).
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based on new facts or law, or changed facts or law, Kasco's Motion must be denied.
2. An extension of the preliminary injunction Was properly denied, where the
underlying covenant not to compete was invalid for a lack of sufficient
consideration.
One of the requirements necessary, in order for a restrictive employment contract
to be valid is that "the covenant be supported by consideration." Systems Concepts, Inc. v.
Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426-427 (Utah 1983); Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237
P.2d 823 (1951). In its Ruling of March 21, 1989, the Trial Court appeared to find that the
covenant was supported by consideration. However, in its Hearing of April 5, 1990 the
issue of consideration was again raised by Benson. The sole purported consideration for
the restrictive covenant was Mr. Benson's employment. Mr. Benson was already employed,
indeed he had already been performing the same job for the company for five years prior
to his signing of the agreement. There was no promise of future or continued employment,
nor was Mr. Benson reemployed.
It is true that a promise of continuing employment can be sufficient consideration
for a restrictive covenant if it is made upon the start of an employee's employment or soon
thereafter. Systems Concepts, Inc., at 426. However, the agreement signed in this case was
not signed until some five years after employment had begun and no promise of continuing
or future employment was made.
The general rule regarding consideration in restrictive employment contracts is
explained in Perthou v. Stewart, 243 F.Supp 655 (D. Ore. 1965). In Perthou, the court held
that where the defendants had signed the non-compete agreement a substantial time after
commencing their employment, and the employer's obligation under the covenants
amounted to nothing more than to employ the defendants, no consideration passed at the
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time of signing.

The court found no consideration existed even though the signed

documents indicated that there was consideration for the agreement.
The current case is similar to Perthou, the purported consideration is set forth in the
agreement "in consideration for Keene employing sales representative..." (Plaintiffs Exhibit
B). However, Keene had already employed Larry Benson. No new consideration passed
at the time the agreement was signed. The employer's obligations were not changed at the
time of signing the agreement. The covenant was not supported by new consideration, and
was therefore invalid. See Mail-Well Envelope Co. v. Saley, 497 P.2d 364, 366 (Ore. 1972).
In refusing to extend the Preliminary Injunction against Larry Benson, the Trial
Court may have correctly found that no new consideration existed.
3.
The Trial Court was correct in refusing to extend the Preliminary
Inunction where the covenant not to compete sought to enjoin an activity that
was neither special, unique or extraordinary.
In Systems Concept, Inc., the court succinctly stated:
This Court has held that to justify enforcement of a restrictive employment covenant
by injunctive relief, the employer must show not only good will, but the services
rendered by the employee were special, unique or extraordinary.
Systems Concept Inc. at 426; Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627-28 (Utah 1982).
The services rendered by Larry Benson were neither special, unique or extraordinary.
Larry Benson was a salesman. His job involved visiting customers and selling them butcher
products. There is nothing special, unique or extraordinary about the job. In fact, by the
time Larry Benson had been working for Keene for six months he was outselling his boss,
and by the end of the next year he was the top salesman for the entire company. While
Larry Benson may possess special abilities as a salesman, there is nothing special, unique
or extraordinary about the job that he was doing. The salesman's job description in this
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case is closer to the non-specialized salesman in Robbins v. Finlay rather than the
specialized salesman in Systems Concept Inc. v. Dixon.
In Robbins v. Finlay, the defendant Finlay was a hearing aid salesman working for
Bel-Tone in an area running from east to west across the State of Utah with a northern
boundary line running through Farmington, Utah and the southern boundary line running
through Point of the Mountain in southern Salt Lake County. The Court found:
The record shows that Finlay's job required little training and is not unlike
the job of many other salesmen. The company's investment in his training
was small... Furthermore, there is no showing that his service was special,
unique, or extraordinary, even if their value to his employer was high.
Robbins at 628.
This type of employment was distinguished by the Court in Systems Concepts, Inc.
v. Dixon. In Systems Concepts, Inc., the employee was found to have rendered services
which were special, unique, or extraordinary. Systems Concepts, Inc. at 426. Specifically
the court found,
Defendant's special and unique service included management of sales
activities and customers referral on a national level extensive personal
promotions in advertising media, products development and design
consultation, development of sales methods and general promotion of
products.
Supra n.ll. (emphasis added)
Larry Benson was a salesman. His job was similar to many other salesmen. He
received very little or no sales training from Keene or Kasco. (Larry Benson Deposition
Page 59-60). The investment of Kasco and Keene in Larry Benson was small. His services
did not include management responsibility, product development, design consultation or
development of company wide sales methods. Neither Keene nor Kasco made extensive
personal promotions of Larry Benson through the advertising media. Injunctive relief in
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this case was not proper against Larry Benson at all. Therefore, the Trial Court was
correct in ruling the injunction should not have been extended an additional six months.
It is of no moment that defendant may have been especially proficient in his
work. General knowledge or expertise acquired through employment is a
common calling and a common calling cannot be appropriated as a trade
secret. The efficiency and skills which an employee develops through his
work belong to him and not to his former employee.
Robbins at 628.
4. Kasco has also failed to show that it will be irreparably harmed if the
injunction is not extended.
In Systems Concept, Inc., the court held:
The second ground for injunctive relief [irreparable harm] is generally
considered the most important. If the moving party is unable to show that
the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would
produce great or irreparable injury, the motion for injunction will usually be
denied, notwithstanding the showing of probable right or entitlement to
recover at law.
Systems Concepts Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983).
Plaintiff Kasco's suit is brought claiming potential harm and damage to their good
will. In the Hearing of April 5, 1990 Judge Young found:
There seems to me to be little reason why Kasco could not be covering all
those customers even on a more rapid schedule than they did before. As I
understand, these are rural people, principally, in small towns, where there
is not going to be a whole lot of butcher shops in small towns for butcher
supplies and all that Kasco has to do is continue or to begin to create the
good will that you claim is so inherent in Larry Benson who has not even
been able to call on these people for eighteen months.
(R. 971, para. 8, 9).
The Court found no irreparable injury to the Plaintiff from a failure to grant its
preliminary injunctions, therefore the Trial Court's ruling was correct, and Kasco's motions
should not be granted.
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Even if Kasco was able to establish an injury, it would not be an "irreparable injury."
An

M

'[i]rreparable injury' justifying an injunction is that which cannot be adequately

compensated in damages or for which damages cannot be compensable in money.' Systems
Concepts at 427-428.
Any damages here would be easily calculable as the net sales from the activities of
the injuring parties. If Larry Benson breached his covenant, appropriate damages would
be the net sales Larry Benson received from former Kasco customers. If Connie Benson
or Tri-B Supply were the injuring party the net sales they received from Kasco customers
would be appropriate damages. Where the damages are so easily calculable there is no
irreparable injury. See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. de Liniere, 572 F. Supp.
246, 249 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
5. If the covenant not to compete was sufficient to sustain a preliminary
injunction, the injunction was correctly calculated by the Court in its Hearing
of March 21, 1989.
Kasco had actual notice in August of 1988 that Larry Benson did not intend to be
bound by the non-compete agreement.

Affidavit of Larry Benson In Opposition to

Plaintiffs Motion for Modification.10 (R. 917).
"Actual Notice" has been defined as knowledge of facts and circumstances
sufficiently pertinent in character to enable reasonably cautious and prudent
persons to investigate and ascertain as to the ultimate facts.
See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Dufield, 681 P.2d 25, 28 (Kansas App. 1984).
Actual notice is also said to be of two kinds, express and implied. Applicable to the instant

0

A copy of the Affidavit of Larry Benson in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Modification is set forth in Exhibit I.
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case is express notice which includes direct information. NLRB v. Vapor Recovery Systems
Co., 311 F.2d 782, 786 (9th Cir 1962).
In August of 1988, Larry Benson was asked for the first time, by Kasco to sign an
employment contract with them. The contract contained a non-compete agreement. Kasco
told Benson that if he did not sign the agreement he would be terminated. (R. 917).
Benson then told Kasco that "he did not wish to retain any restrictive covenants in his
employment..." (R. 973) (R. 917). Benson also told Kasco that he deemed the contract
void. These express statements to Kasco gave them actual notice at that time that Mr.
Benson would not be bound by the non-compete clause in the agreement he had signed
with Keene. Kasco, at that time, had the right to terminate Mr. Benson and insist on
compliance with the provision. By allowing Benson to continue employment in light of a
known breach, with knowledge that he would not honor the non-compete provision of the
contract, Kasco has waived any rights that it may have had at a later time to claim that it
did not know that Mr. Benson did not wish to be bound by the non-compete provision of
the agreement. Moreover, Kasco has waived any claim for lack of notice, where it sent a
non-compete agreement as well as a policy provision requiring the non-compete agreement
be signed to Larry Benson and he refused to sign the agreement.
Kasco waived its right to insist that the non-compete term was to start at the
termination of Mr. Benson's employment when it continued to employ Mr. Benson after
his statement that he would not be bound by the non-compete provision. Any default in
the performance of a contract may be waived by the injured party. See Zoeller v. Snyder,
297 P.2d 40, 41-42 (CaL App. 1956). Additionally, any act by the "injured" party indicating
an intent to continue with the agreement will operate as a conclusive election to waive the
breach. Sitlington v. Fulton, 281 F.2d 552, 555 (10th Cir. 1960). Such acts include the
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"injured" party receiving money in the continued performance of the contract. In other
words, where a contracting party, with knowledge of a breach by the other party receives
money in the performance of the contract, he will have waived the breach. See Einot Inc.
v. Einot Sales Co., 49 N.W. 2d 625, 627 (Nebraska 1951).
Kasco was on actual notice that Benson intended not to be bound by a material
portion of the agreement through his express statement as well as his refusal to sign the
non-compete agreement. Because Kasco did nothing upon actual notice of the breach,
i.e. Mr. Benson's refusal to be bound to the non-compete agreement and his refusal to sign
the new non-compete agreement, Kasco waived its right to rely on the non-compete
agreement. Kasco continued to employ Mr. Benson, continued to pay him his commissions
and continued to have him service his route while Kasco received payments for goods and
services provided through orders derived through the efforts of Mr. Benson. Larry Benson
operated to his detriment in relying on the absence of the non-compete agreement, after
expressly stating that he would not be bound by the former agreement and would not sign
Kasco's new agreement. Kasco should not now be allowed to claim that the non-compete
provisions should have gone into effect on the date of Mr. Benson's termination when it
waived its rights under the non-compete of the agreement by continuing to perform other
remaining portions of the agreement after Mr. Benson's breach. In the March 21, 1989
Hearing, Judge Young specifically found the notice received by Kasco in August of 1988
was sufficient.
The Preliminary Injunction will be granted to expire eighteen months from
August, 1988 because I believe that at the time the company was on notice
that Mr. Benson did not wish to retain any restrictive covenants in his
employment, thereafter, the company would be willing to either - - require
to terminate him or deal otherwise with him. At that point the restrictive
covenant would be terminated as to its application of Mr. Benson except for
eighteen months thereafter.
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(R. 973, p. 7).
Kasco's appeal as to the Motion for Extension of Preliminary Injunction against
Larry Benson should therefore be denied.
6. The district court could modify the covenant if required to do so by equity.
Covenants against competition are not favored by courts because of the public policy
against restraint of trade and hardships resulting from interference with a person's means
of livelihood. Bob Pagan Ford, Inc. v. Smith, 638 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App. 1982).
The proceeding to determine whether a restrictive covenant is reasonable "is in
equity, and the court may reduce the duration of the restrictive covenant to that which it
considers reasonable under the circumstances. Bob Pagan Ford at 178; Fullerton Lumber
Co. v. Torborg, 70 N.W. 2d 585 (Wis. 1955).
Examples of factors which may weigh into the court's decision are "whether the
interests which the covenant was designed to protect are still outstanding." Bob Pagan Ford
at 178; "hardships which would be imposed upon the employee by enforcement of the
restrictions," Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. de Liniere, 572 F. Supp,. 246, 249
(N.D. Ga. 1983) and; the publics interest in its "ability to choose the professional services
it prefers." JcL
In the present case all of these factors weigh against the granting of injunctive relief.
The court specifically found Kasco has had sufficient time to protect its goodwill. If an
injunction is granted against Connie Benson and Tri-B Supply they will be prevented from
serving the customers for whom they have worked for the past two years. It would leave
them with no client base in a business that thrives on sales to regular clients. If an
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injunction were to issue, damage to Connie Benson and Tri-B Supply while they waited
ultimately to prevail would be catastrophic as a result of the loss of most of their income.
The affect of the loss of income pending the outcome of this dispute would, by reason of
the differing financial strength of the parties bear far more heavily on Connie Benson and
Tri-B Supply than on Kasco. As shown in part 4 above, any damages to which Kasco is
entitled are readily calculable: Finally, many of Tri-B Supply's customers would be forced
to pay higher prices for inferior goods and services if Tri-B is precluded from serving them.
When weighing the relative effects, the gross disparity, in relative harms requires, in
equity that Kasco's motions for injunctive relief be denied.
B.

The Trial Court properly denied Kasco's Motions for Preliminary Injunctions
against Connie and Robert Benson.
1. The covenant not to compete is not enforceable as to Connie and Robert
Benson.

Generally a restrictive covenant should not be directly enforceable against Connie
and Robert Benson because they were not a party to the employment agreement. County
of Clark v. Bonanza No. 7, 615 P.2d 939 (Nev. 1980) (". . . none is liable upon a contract
except those who are parties to it."); Mitten v. Weston, 615 P.2d 60 (Colo. App. 1980) (" .
. . a contract can be enforced only against a party to that contract."); see also, Commercial
Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977). Moreover, the restrictive
covenant is not enforceable against Connie or Robert Benson because there was no
consideration to support its enforcement against them. Resource Management Co. v. Weston
Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) (Tor a promise to be legally enforceable, it must be
supported by consideration.").
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Kasco sought to have the Trial Court issue a preliminary injunction against Connie
and Robert Benson prohibiting them from doing business. However, the plaintiffs Verified
Complaint fails to allege any wrongdoing on the part of Connie or Robert Benson. A
review of the Plaintiffs Complaint shows that the entire gist of the Plaintiffs allegations
therein go against the Defendant, Larry Benson. The only allegation against Connie
Benson is that "to the extent" Connie Benson has used Larry Benson's contacts and special
knowledge, then she has engaged in unfair competition. No allegations are made as to
Robert Benson.
The allegation against Connie Benson is clearly insufficient to support a preliminary
injunction. First, Connie Benson may be held liable, if at all, only if her actions are so
interconnected with Larry Benson that she is deemed an extension of Larry Benson
violating the restrictive covenant.

In Madison v. La Sene, 268 P.2d 1006 (Wash. 1954),

Andrew La Sene sold his upholstery business and agreed not to compete for five years.
The sales contract also gave Madison exclusive right to use the name "La Sene's Custom
Upholstery". After Madison moved the business to a new location, La Sene and his son,
Ray, opened up "R. A. La Sene's Upholstery" at the old address. The trial court enjoined
both father and son from operating an upholstery business in violation of the restrictive
covenant. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court held that since the son was not a
party to the covenant not to compete, he "couldn't be denied the right to make a legitimate
effort to carry on an upholstery business". Madison at 1009. The only restriction placed on
the son was that he couldn't carry on the upholstery business in association with or with the
direct or indirect assistance of his father.
Consequently, since Connie's actions were found by the Court not to be an
extension of Larry's actions or in furtherance of Larry's breach of his covenant not to
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compete, Kasco has failed to meet its burden of proof and Kasco is not entitled to a
preliminary injunction.
2. Plaintiffs cited cases are distinguishable.
Kasco relies extensively on the case of McCart v. H & R Block Inc., 470 N.E.2d 756
(Ind. App. 1984) to support its proposition that Connie and Robert Benson should be
enjoined. McCart, however, deals with a drastically different situation than the one at hand.
McCart deals with a situation where the spouse who is subject to the covenant not to
compete took an active role in running the day to day operations of the new business. For
instance, in McCart the court held that the husband could be enjoined from aiding his wife,
who was then actively competing against her former employer, in breaching her covenant
not to compete.
Such is not the case here where Larry Benson takes no part in running the day-today operations of Tri B Supply and Kasco cited no authority to support its contention that
Connie Benson or Robert Benson, who have no contractual relation at all with Kasco,
should be forced to cease operating a business to which Larry Benson, husband and father,
has no connection, simply because the Plaintiff doesn't want the competition.

Kasco's

assertion that the only reason that Connie and Robert Benson are able to get new accounts
is because of their relationship to Larry Benson is without sufficient support in fact or
evidence. As with any business which markets goods, sales are a combination of service,
price, and inter-personal relationships. In the present situation, Kasco's problem is that (1)
they cannot keep a salesman in the territory, and (2) they have priced themselves out of the
market. While many customers may have warmed-up to Connie and Robert Benson
because they are related to Larry Benson, the important determining factor in their decision
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was price. (Deposition of Connie Benson, Page 139, 144, 150). Particularly telling is the
deposition of Craig Smart.11
Q. At the time Robert and Connie Benson came and provided service to
you in April of 1989, do you recall any conversations that you had with either
of them?
A. I just recall that they mentioned that they were - - that they had the
business now and they were coming, to see if they could have my business
at that time and they tell me their prices which was considerably less than
what I had been paying for the same service."
Q. So their prices were much better than Kasco's?
A. A-hum (affirmatively) and because of that reason I said, (well, sure, you
know, we'll - - go with you." (Deposition of Craig Smart, Page 31, lines 10
through 21.) (emphasis added).
Judge Young was aware that, if the covenant not to compete was valid, the purpose
of the covenant and Judge Young's Preliminary Injunction would be thwarted, if Connie
Benson was aided in any way by Larry Benson in running the butcher supply business.
These activities, specifically proscribed by Judge Young, are the types of activities
which led to the courts in Plaintiffs cited cases, enforcing non-compete agreements against
third parties. These types of activities were not engaged in by Larry Benson with Connie
Benson or Robert Benson.
Specifically, in the Judge's ruling of March 21, 1989, Judge Young ordered,
Its obvious to the court that unless Mr. Benson is enjoined from
communicating or sharing any of the information he would have received as
an employee of Keene and thereafter Kasco with Mrs. Benson that the effect
of an injunction, preliminary injunction, would be neutralized, and thus Mr.
Benson is enjoined from communicating any information in this relation to
Mrs. Benson... .If it determined by the court that the objective of the parties
is to attempt, by utilizing Mrs. Benson who has never called on anyone as an
employee, to go around the court's order, then obviously Mr. Tateoka, I will
not be happy about that. I don't believe that's my desire. She hasn't been
11

A copy of the relevant page is included as Exhibit J.
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a previous employee so far as I have been able to see and if that is utilized
as a ruse and a guise to avoid the responsibility of the contract, that is in
disharmony with my ruling. The ruling is that the provisions of the agreement
that apply to restrictions as to covenant not to compete in relation to the
Keene, and thereafter Kasco contract, are enforceable and valid and that Mr.
Benson is expected to make a good faith effort to comply with those and to
see that his assistance, communication, contact, conversation, whatever else
it may be, with Mrs. Benson maintains the spirit of the court's ruling.
(R. 973, p. 7, 8).
In his ruling of April 5, 1990, Judge Young found Larry Benson's contacts with
Connie were in harmony with his previous order.
The best information that I have available to me now is that there has been
an excellent effort by Mr. Benson to abide by the terms and conditions of the
restrictive covenant, consistent with the court's ruling that he abide by those
from August of 1988 until eighteen months thereafter, which I would assume
would be about March of 1990.
(R. 971, p. 3).
All of the sales of Tri-B-Supply are the direct result of the efforts of Connie and
Robert Benson (R. 60, R. 818, para. 2). They have nothing to do with Larry Benson. (R.
823-824, para. 9). Connie Benson and Robert Benson, contrary to the assertions of Kasco,
received training from Huwa Sales in Denver, Colorado in order to make them more
effective in their sales presentations (R. 820, para. 8). Connie Benson contacted all of TriB-Supply's customers, first by letter and then through personal follow-up contact Connie
Benson Deposition, Page 144). The customers names were garnered from the telephone
book (Connie Benson Deposition, Page 37). All these potential customers also received
notice that Larry Benson was not going to be providing goods or services as he was no
longer part of Tri-B-Supply Company (R. 820, para. 9, Exhibit F). When specifically
questioned by customers, they were informed that Larry Benson could have nothing to do
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with the company due to the Trial Court's Preliminary Injunction (Connie Benson
Deposition, Page 150).
The facts are simple.

We have here an effort by an enormous multi-state

conglomerate, Kasco, to destroy a small local competitor with the aid of the courts. The
simple truth of the matter is that Tri-B-Supply, Connie and Robert Benson, provide better
service, better quality, and a better price than Kasco. It would be a grave injustice to
restrain the individual efforts of Connie and Robert Benson in order to benefit Kasco. If
a covenant not to compete is enforceable against third parties it is only enforceable against
those who are acting in conjunction with a party to the covenant. The court found that is
not the case here.
These findings of fact are consistent with the record. Therefore, Kasco's Petition
for Permission to Appeal the Interlocutory Order Denying the Preliminary Injunction
against either Connie or Robert Benson should be denied.
C. The Trial Court was correct in denying Kasco's Motion to Amend its
original Verified Complaint.
One of the principal factors in allowing an amendment is whether the amendment
is based on a bad faith motive Christensen v. Utah Transit Authority, 649 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah
1982); Trinity Carton Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 767 F.2d 184, 194 (5th Cir. 1985); Hum
v. Retirement Fund Trust Plumbing, etc., 648 F.2d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally
Childers v. Inc. School District No. 1 of Bryan County, 676 F.2d 1338, 1343 (10th Cir. 1982).
In this case, Kasco is acting in bad faith by attempting to bring in a new defendant,
Robert Benson, with whom it does not have privity of contract. More importantly, Robert
Benson has no significant contact with Larry Benson that would require Robert to be
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restrained. The causes of action and the remedies Kasco seeks are applicable to its past
employee, Larry Benson, with whom Kasco had an employment contract. Kasco had no
contract with Robert Benson. In this instance, Kasco's sole remedy should be limited to
restrain its past employee and should not be expanded to include extended family not in
privity of contract.

If the alleged wrong occurred (revealing trade secrets), then the

appropriate remedy is to assess damages for the revealing of trade secrets and to restrain
the holder of the information. To restrain an innocent third party from working would be
a restraint of trade and should not be allowed absent a strong showing of impropriety.
Kasco has not effectively demonstrated a claim against Robert Benson and should not be
allowed to amend their Complaint.
Robert Benson is an employee of Tri-B-Supply who works in sales and service (R.
422, para. 1). He has contributed no money to the enterprise (R. 423, para. 8). He was
asked to participate in the business by Connie Benson, not Larry Benson. He was not
involved in the actual decision to start the business (R. 423, para. 9). He received training
and the know how to do his job from a firm in Denver; training in which Larry Benson was
not involved (R. 423, para. 10, 11). This training was never discussed with Larry Benson
(R. 423, para. 11). Robert has not participated in or made decisions regarding the choice
of suppliers (R. 423, para. 7). Finally, Robert does not live with Connie or Larry Benson
(R. 422, para. 2). Robert has not discussed with Larry Benson anything related to the
performance of his job at Tri-B-Supply. Also, Robert has no contact either directly or
tangibly with customer lists, catalogs, or other materials allegedly taken or received from
Kasco (R. 423, para. 4).
Just because his father is Larry Benson, and Larry Benson is currently involved in
controversy with the Plaintiff, does not mean that his son, Robert Benson, should also be
27

brought into the conflict.
Kasco is apparently attempting not to recover damages on claims for dissemination
of proprietary information, which damages are easily calculated, instead it appears to be
attempting to stop Tri-B-Supply, a small family run business just starting up, from
competing with it. If this is the intent of Kasco, the Complaint should not be amended to
allow the bringing in of a new party. The Rule should be construed to allow fair trade
especially in this instance where the damages, if any, are not against Robert but are against
Larry D. Benson.
Another principal factor to be examined in connection with the offer of an
amendment is whether the amendment will be futile. If the amendment is futile, the Court
is well justified in not allowing leave to amend. Fortnan v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962);
Sooner Products Co. v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1983).
In this case, the Plaintiffs amendment is futile and not likely to succeed on the
merits. As has been shown previously, Kasco's claims against Connie and Robert Benson
are without basis in fact or law and therefore unlikely to succeed.

The Trial Court

therefore correctly refused to allow Kasco to amend its Complaint over a year after the
original Complaint had been answered by the Defendants.
D. Kasco Should Not Be Granted Prospective Injunctive Relief
Enforcement of restrictive covenants in employment contracts is a matter of equity.
Bob Pagan Ford at 178. The agreement signed between Keene and Larry Benson provided
for a covenant not to compete for a period of eighteen months after Larry terminated his
employment with Keene. Larry Benson terminated his employment with Kasco, Keene's
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successor to the agreement, on March 1, 1989. By its express terms therefore, the
agreement terminated September 1, 1990.
The district court found the agreement between Keene and Larry Benson to be
terminated in August of 1988. While the more correct result would have been to void the
agreement entirely, the court held that the covenant would begin to run from that date.
By the court's order therefore the covenant expired April 1, 1990.
As shown above the covenant itself is invalid and therefore no injunctive relief
prospective or otherwise is called for in this case. However, if we were to assume the
covenant was valid, under either the express terms as found in the agreement or the
equitable terms as found by the court, the time period covered by the covenant has expired.
Courts in this state have not addressed the issue of whether prospective injunctive
relief can be granted after the expiration of the period covered by a covenant. Kasco has
cited to decisions from Florida, Virginia, and Wisconsin which appear to grant such relief,
but decisions from Oregon, Professional Business Services v. Gustafson, 590 P.2d 729 (Ore
1979) and Washington Alexander & Alexander Inc v. Wohlman, 578 P.2d 530 (Wash. App.
1978) both rejected such relief.
In Professional Business Services v. Gustafson, Professional Business Services (PBS)
was seeking to enforce a covenant requiring Gustafson not compete with PBS for three
years. Gustafson left PBS' employ in November of 1975. Gustafson began immediate
employment with a former customer of PBS. In June of 1976 PBS filed suit. The trial
court dismissed and PBS appealed. The appeal was not argued until December 4, 1978,
more than three years from the termination of Gustafson's employment. Gustafson had
engaged in her employment, which plaintiff alleged was in violation on the non-competition
covenant, during the entire period of time. In light of these facts the Court held:
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Since the appeal was not granted until December 4, 1978, the three-year
period during which defendant was bound not to compete under the
agreement had expired by its own terms, and the suit for injunction is moot.
Professional Business Services at 730.
The eighteen-month period set forth in the Keene/Benson contract has likewise
expired by its own terms, and is therefore moot.
In Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Wohlman, suit was brought to determine the validity
of non-competition covenants entered into by employees of a local insurance brokerage
firm. The covenant, in Wohlman's case, was to be effective for two years. On January 16
1976 Wohlman terminated his employment with Alexander & Alexander (A & A).
Between January 12, and January 16, 1976 Wohlman personally contacted all of his clients
and informed them of the formation of a new firm of which he would be a partner. A &
A brought suit to enjoin Wohlman from competing in violation of the covenant. The trial
court denied the motion holding the covenant to be invalid. A & A appealed and the
appeal was heard on April 10, 1978 more than two years from the time Wohlman left his
employ with A & A
The Washington court of appeals reversed the trial court on the issue of the validity
of the covenant but refused to grant the injunctive relief, because the lapse of the
delineated time would be "inappropriate and manifestly unfair . . ." Alexander & Alexander
at 540.
While the Oregon court summarily dismissed the idea of prospective injunctive
relief, the Washington Court like the courts cited by Kasco appears to view the matter as
a weighing of the equities. See Roanoke Engineering Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum 280 S.E. 2d
882, 886 (Va. 1982).
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The district court has already found that Kasco has had sufficient time to protect its
good will. If this court were to determine that prospective injunctive relief is available in
this state, applying it in this case would not be equitable, but only punitive. Where such
is the only possible reason, courts weighing the equities have rejected injunctive relief. .See
Premise Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 271, 278 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. de Liniere, 572 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Ga 1983); Alexander & Alexander
Inc. v. Wohlmer, 578 P.2d 530 (Wash. App. 1978).
The equities in this case weigh against the granting of any injunctive relief. They
clearly outweigh any claim for prospective injunctive relief. Kasco's Interlocutory Appeal
should therefore be denied.
CONCLUSION
Kasco would have this Court believe that this case hinges on two issues of law not
before decided in the state of Utah; (1) Whether a covenant not to compete can be
enforced against parties who are not in privity with either of the covenantors, and (2)
Whether an employer should be entitled to prospective injunctive relief against a former
employee where the time period for which the parties covenanted has already expired.
While both of these issues are undoubtedly important, they are not important in this case.
Neither of these issues should be reached by this Court. Respondent has shown that
Petitioner's appeal in this case is untimely and in gross violation of both the letter and spirit
of Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure. Furthermore, the underlying covenant
in this case is invalid because it was not supported by adequate consideration, and it seeks
to enjoin a common calling and not services which are neither unique or special.
Even were the covenant valid, and Kasco's appeal timely, this case is still not the
appropriate case for the determination of these legal issues. Both of these issues require
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that there be some form of active participation by a covenantor with a third party in order
to have the third party subject to the non-competition covenant. The trial court specifically
found that Connie Benson, Robert Benson and Tri-B Supply did not receive such assistance
from Larry Benson. Thus, even were the covenants valid, and even were this Court to
decide that third parties could be enjoined under a covenant not to compete and the
prospective relief should be granted, such would not be appropriate in this case.
Kasco is attempting to use the invalid covenant, in this case, to eliminate the
competition of a small local competitor. The Bensons should be afforded the right to work
without being subjected to the harassment and crippling costs of multiple hearings, relitigating previously denied and presently moot restraining orders and appeals of the same.
The trial court has determined that the Bensons have acted properly and in
accordance with the injunctions issued by that court. This Court should not second guess
the finder of fact where, as shown, the trial court has sufficient grounds to deny Kasco's
spurious motions for injunction and amendment.
Kasco's appeal should therefore be denied and Bensons awarded their costs and
attorney's fees acquired to defend this appeal.
DATED this £ ^ d a y of November, 1990.

McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

By ^iL^

&

^ ~

Reid Tateoka
Shawn D. Turner
Attorneys for Defendants
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first year or two that you joined Keene?
A

I never received any sales training with Keene,

Q

Who were your supervisors when you joined?

A

Don Lewis and Ed Mason and LeRoy Moser.

Q

M-o-s-e-r?

A

M-o-s-e-r,

Q

Did you have any other supervisors between that

none.

time and after Keene became KASCO and the time you resigned?
A

I had a lot of supervisors.

They had people

coming and going like flies.
Q

Really?

Do you remember who they were?

A

Yeah.

Q

Could you list them for me?

A

Rob Rickertson, Bob Dutcher.

Q

Could you slow down a little?

How does Bob

Rickertson spell his name?
A

R-i-c-k-e-r-t-s-o-n.
MR. ARRINGTON:

Could we go off the record a

minute?
(Brief recess.)
Q

(By Mr. Arrington)

Let's get back on the record.

Before our break you were identifying supervisors you had.
You'd mentioned Don Lewis—is that Dan Lewis?
A

Don, D-o-n.
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employment that you'd be required to sign the agreement; is
that correct?
A

It certainly appeared that way, yes, at the time.

Q

In paragraph 7 you say you signed the agreement

under duress.
A

What do you mean?

I would say it's duress when you're told to do

something you don't want to do and it's put to you in such a
way that you feel like you're obligated to do it.
Q

You signed this agreement but you didn't want to

sign it?
A

You're right, strictly because-—forget it.

Q

You could have not signed the agreement; is that

correct?
A

I could have not signed it.

Q

Is that correct?

A

Correct.

Q

Did anyone threaten you with legal action or

physical harm if you didn't sign the agreement?
A

They had no cause for either.

Q

I agree.

A

I'm bigger than they are.

Q

In paragraph 9 you say that "All of the cont acts

that I had with grocery stores were made prior to my
becoming eimployed with Keene C orporation n

Are you say ing

that there was not one single store that you hadn't
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established a contact with before when you joined Keene?
A

Oh, obviously there could have been stores that

came into being after I was employed b y —
Q

At the time you were hired when you were handed a

customer list?
A

At the time I was hired I'd been involved one

time or another.
Q

As a cookie representative?

A

There was a few meat plants that I hadn't been

Q

So there were some contacts that you hadn't made?

A

But there was a lot of (those I'd been into with

in.

Fur Breeders—
MR. TATEOKA:

Object to the extent that you're

mischaracterizing paragraph 9.

Statement says that all of

the contacts he had with grocery stores were made prior t o —
all of his contacts.
Q

Okay.

A

That would be correct, all of the contacts I had

with grocery stores.
Q

So there would be some specialty meat stores or

other businesses that dealt in the butcher supply area that
you wouldn't have contacted as a cookie representative with
Grandma's or Archway Cookies?
A

Right.
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Q

When you say contacts with grocery stores, what

do you mean?
A

I mean I'd been in there for the purpose of

selling or distributing product.
Q

Would you have contacts with the meat managers

for all grocery stores prior to joining Keene?
A

The contacts that I would have had would have

been either through the brokerage firm or, like I say, when
we were letting them sample cookies.
Q

Would you have had contacts with all meat

managers or those responsible for purchasing the butcher
supplies and those grocery stores before joining Keene?
A

I was exposed to them when I w a s —

Q

That means you would have been in the store with

them, or does that mean that you had contacts with them and
were personally known to them?
A

A lot of them I met at the time I was making

headquarter calls, and a lot of them I met in the stores,
yes.
Q

Would you say all?

A

I wouldn't say all, I would say most of them.

knew who they were, they knew who I was.
Q

Since the inventory with Rich Wagner have you

discovered any other KASCO documents or items?
A

Everything that I've discovered I returned to

I
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Keene or to KASCO.
Q

Have you returned items to Keene—or to KASCO,

excuse me—that you discovered after the inventory with Rich
Wagner?
A

Mailed stuff to me I returned to them.

Q

Did you discover any items after that inventory

that weren't mailed to you?
A

I found a few.

I found—there was a knife or

something that we found in the truck when we cleaned it out.
Q

Do you still have that knife?

A

No, I sent them a check for it.

Q

In paragraph 13 you state you have not called

upon or solicited or attempted to contact any of KASCOfs
customers regarding the purchase or rent of meat cutting
products.

Is that correct?

A

At that time I hadn't, no.

Q

And at that time it would have been March 20th,

1989, is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Isn't it true that there were some contacts—

well, when you say I have not called upon, what do you mean?
Do you mean you talked face to face with someone?
A

I mean I have not called upon them.

Q

Does that mean a personal visit?

A

That means I have not called them, I have not
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that you brought—and that you've already looked at and
identified, as I believe, numbers, what, 25—was it 26?
MR. TATEOKA:
Q

27 through 68.

— 2 6 through 68.

Those are complete as far as

you know?
A

As far as I can tell, yes.

Q

What documents have you brought that reflect

pricing of your products and services, the products and
services of Tri-B-Supply?
A

Do you want to ask that again, please?

Q

What documents have you brought that reflect

Tri-B-Supply's prices for the products and services that it
is going to sell to its customers?

A

She's got the books.

Q

When you refer to the books, you mean those

brochure-type books from the various suppliers that you
brought with you today?

1

A

Yes.

Q

Those books have pricing information in them?

A

Yes.

Q

What about documents that reflect Tri-B-Supply's

prices that it's going to charge its customers?
A

Well, it's in there .and it's on those things that

1 you've got there.
!

Q

So you've taken your prices from the—when I say
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you, for the business, Tri-B-Supply, the butcher supply
business--your prices have come from the brochures that
you've received from the suppliers, correct?
A

They have come from the suppliers—our prices, is

that what you asked?
Q

That's what I'm asking you, if—that's what

appears to me that you have said.

I've asked you what

documents you have brought that reflect the prices that
Tri-B-Supply charges to its customers, and you referred me
to those pamphlets supplied to you by your suppliers.
A

They supply the books, I put in my prices.

Q

Do you rely on those books at all in setting your

prices?
A

Yes.

Q

So we'll get those books and we'll look at them

in detail and get that information.

So you do rely on those

books that have been given to you by your suppliers in
setting Tri-B-Supply's prices?
A

Yes.

Q

What other documents do you have pertaining to

the prices that Tri-B-Supply charges for its products and
services that you've brought with you?
A

I need you to ask that again, please.

Q

So far we've identified those pamphlets or

brochures from suppliers as documents that you rely on in
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setting prices.

Are there any other documents that you rely

on or that otherwise reflect the prices that you charge your
customers?
A

No.

Q

Okay.
MR. TATEOKA:

Excuse me.

Is your question are

there other things that she uses to set her prices, or is
your question are there other documents that evidence what
price she asks?
Q

(By Mr. McGarvey)

All documents whatsoever

pertaining to your prices—how you set your prices, what
your prices, are as requested in the subpoena.
A

I get my price list and I do my markup and I

write it down in my book.
Q

You don't get your price list—excuse me.

If I'm

not mistaken, in Robert's deposition there were certain
price lists that we've made exhibits to this deposition.
A

Right.
MR. TATEOKA:

Q
Connie.

Correct.

(By Mr. McGarvey)

I'm not trying to confuse you,

There are some documents that appear to be price

lists of Tri-B-Supply, and I'm going to show these to you
and ask you if these are some of the documents that you've
prepared.

I want just want to make sure that we have

specifics responsive to the question.
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A

We do.

Q

And so I've asked, what do you rely on in setting

your prices, and so we have found out, as I understand—you
can correct me if I'm wrong—you rely on those brochures or
pamphlets that you receive from suppliers to a certain
extent, and we'll get into that later.

Is that correct?

A

Yes,

Q

Also, Deposition Exhibits 4 through 7, which I'll

hand to you now, also appear to be information pertaining to
Tri-B-Supply's prices; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Any other documents whatsoever that you know of

pertaining to prices that Tri-B-Supply sets and requires for
its customers?
A

I wasn't listening, I'm sorry.

Will you ask it

again?
Q

Certainly.

Are there any other documents besides

those now that we've identified that pertain to the prices
that Tri-B-Supply sets and has its customers pay?
A

Just these and them books.

Q

What documents have you brought that are

responsive to the request for customer lists?
A

I have no customer list.

Q

What documents are there that you have brought—

can I have those back, please?
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A

You bet.

Q

— t h a t reflects Tri-B-Supply's customers?

A

What do I have that reflects the customers that

we go see?
Q

Yes.

A

The phone book and these right here, these store

rosters, only I haven't used those much except f o r —
(Discussion off the record.)
Q

(By Mr. McGarvey)

Back on the record.

So if I

understand you correctly, Tri-B-Supply's customers are
obtained from store rosters and from the telephone book?
A

Yes.

Q

Any other source?

A

People that might call us and we'll go out and

see what they need.
Q

Are there any documents that reflect who

Tri-B-Supply's customers are to date?
A

I don't think I heard you correctly.

Q

Are there any documents what reflect who Tri-B's

customers are to date?
A

The invoices are who our customers are.

Q

So that would be, then, Tri-B's Supply's invoices

to its customers?
A

Yes.

Q

Each of Tri-B-Supply's customers can be found
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within th<ose

documents?

A

Yes.

Q

Does Tri-B-Supply ever sell to customers without

using an invoice?
A

No.

Q

Do you use the white pages or the yellow pages in

the phone book in obtaining lists of customers?
A

Well, the yellow pages.

It's a bit faster.

Q

So is your answer, then, that you use the yellow

pages?
A

Mostly.

Q

But you use both, then?

A

Yes.

Q

What is a store roster?

A

It's a piece of paper that a particular store

headquarter sends out over—not send out, excuse me—that
they have of all their particular stores.

I, however, do

not use the Smith's because I have been unable to see the
manager.

The one that's over Smith's, I have not seen him

as to this day.

And Albertson's went with another company,

so I don' t use them any more at all.
Q

I'm not sure I understood what your answer was.

You don't use who?
A

I don't use the store rosters because the manager

that's over the meat industry is--I haven't been in to see
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him yetQ

Now, you're talking about the manager over the

meat industry over all of Smith's stores?
A

All of Smith's, yes.

And the man that is over

all the Albertson's stores went to another business to do
their business.
Q

Are there only rosters for Smith's and

Albertson's, then, that you know of?
A

In this particular part, yes.

Q

And you don't use either of those rosters

anymore?
A

Not at the present time.

Q

Did you ever use the Albertson's roster?

A

Yes.

Q

How did you use it?

A

Well, because I sent a letter to Craig Moss at

the Albertson's division office.
Q

And that's the extent of your use of the roster?

A

Yup.

Q

So in other words, you used the roster to get

Craig Moss's name so you could send the letter to him?
A

To call him to see if I could get his business—

stores.
Q

And is Craig Moss with Albertson's?

A

Yes.
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MR. TATEOKA:

Excuse me.

(Witness consults with counsel off the record.)
MR. TATEOKA:
Q
question?

Would you rephrase your question?

(By Mr. McGarvey)

Did you not understand my last

I just noticed that your counsel was talking with

you, and so I kind of suspect that perhaps you didn't
understand my last question.

Is that true?

A

Yes.

Q

Would you like me to repeat it?

A

Yes.

Q

Are there any other stores, then, other than the

ones indicated on your invoices that you sent the March 10th
letter to that have not yet become your customers?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you remember the names of any of those stores?

A

No, I don't.

Q

Approximately how many were there?

A

I do not know.

Q

Was it more or less than ten?

A

It would be more.

Q

More or less than a hundred?

A

I don't know.

Q

It could be more than a hundred?

A

It could be.

Q

Could it be more than two hundred?
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A

I have no idea.

Q

Could it be more than five hundred?

A

I wouldn't think so.

Q

Probably less than five hundred, then?

Is that

your recollection?
A

I would say that it was less than four or five

hundred with these.
Q

Now, we're talking only about the stores that are

not yet your customers.
A

There wouldn't have been.

Q

That are not indicated on the rosters?

A

There would not be more than three or four

hundred, no.
Q

Who paid for the postage on these letters?

A

I did.

Q

Out of your personal bank account?

A

I think it was cash.

Q

Okay.

A

I think it was.

Q

Who actually signed the letters, you or Larry?

A

Nobody signed—

Was it cash from the ceramics business?

MR. TATEOKA:

Objection.

Q

The letters went out unsigned?

A

Yes.

Q

They went out exactly as it appears on Deposition
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1

A

Both nothing—what?

2

Q

You said, And we used it for both*

3

A

We would have used it if h e — h e was contemplating

4

quitting then, okay?

5
6

And going into the butcher supply business on his

A

No, just in case he wanted to start another

own?

7
8

Q

business, okay?

9

Q

So what do you mean by both?

10

A

Well, we both just put our names down on that

11

I.D. number, that tax I.D. number.

12

Q

Is that the same number you have today?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

What was the name of your ceramics business back

16

A

Same as it is now: Tri-B-Supply.

17

Q

Did you file a dba or anything with the state?

15

18

then?

Did you file any documents with the state—

19

A

No.

20

Q

— a t that time?

21

A

As a name, you mean?

22

Q

Did you file any documents with the state at that

24

A

No.

25

Q

Larry participated with you, however, in your

23

time?
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1

A

In Syracuse, yes.

2

Q

Are there other Hamblin's Foodtowns in other

3

towns?

4

A

I'm not aware of any.

5

Q

When you went into Hamblin's Foodtown and met

6

with the meat manager, did that manager have a list of

7

things that he needed at that time, or did you suggest

8

certain items that they might purchase, or how did it come

9

about that you actually sold these particular items?

10
11
12

A

He told me what he needed in order to run his

meat shopQ

So you just asked him, here I am, what do you

13

need, introducing yourself and asking him what he needed,

14

and he told you?

15

A

I introduced myself and asked him if he would

16

like to do business with us, and then he wanted—of course,

17

they always want to know the price, a n d —

18

Q

How did you give him the price?

19

A

I told him what it would run for his 300

20

equipment for his grinder, and then I'd tell him the price.

21

And then I asked him how many, what he would need, and

22

that's why you see what you see.

23

Q

Did you hand him a price list?

24

A

No.

25

price lists.

We don't hand individuals — individual stores

The contract that—this would be a contract
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Did you tell him that Larry was expected to again

Q

join wiibh Tri-B-Supply after the restraining order ended?
A

I think they assumed that.

Q

It was your understanding that he realized that?
MR. TATEOKA:

Objection.

She doesn't know what

his und(srstanding is.
THE WITNESS:

He got a letter, he read the

letter, and then I showed up a n d —
(By Mr. McGarvey)

Q

Are you referring to the March

1 10th le tter?
Yes, because he knew from that letter that we had

A

star ted our own business and he was very happy about that,
and- Why do you believe he was happy that you started

Q

your own business?
A

He stated so.

Q

What were the circumstances that led up to him

tell ing you that he was happy?
A

Because he was tired of the high prices with

Kasco.
Q

You were discussing the prices of Kasco?

A

We weren't discussing prices per se, we were—he

was telling me how he felt that Kasco's prices were too
high ;

aiid

he saw mine and he says, This looks good, I'll

stick with you.
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some are still cold.
Q

That introduction that you just gave, did you

give basically that same introduction with respect to every
store you approached?
A

Yes, because we had to tell them that if they

called the store that Larry was restrained and that he could
not talk this business for one year*
Q

Did this person at this store have a list of

things that he wanted also, or did you suggest things for
him to buy?
A

Well, first of all, what some of them do, they

pull out their last invoice from Kasco, because a lot of
them, well, they either do that or they—they show us the
plates and the knives that they've been using.
how we know what equipment they need.

And that's

As to however many,

then they tell us that a n d —
Q

Then you'd give them a price?

A

Well, the price comes first, you know.

They want

to know the price first.
Q

Are any of these customers—or were any of these

customers previously serviced by anyone other than Larry, to
your knowledge?
A

Before me?

Q

Yes.

A

I have no idea.
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Larry Benson, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and states as follows:
1. I am a defendant in the above-entitled matter and as such have personal
knowledge of all facts contained herein.
2.

In January of 1989, Connie Benson became concerned about obtaining a

business license because of increased traffic coming to her home. As I was experiencing
some difficulty with my employment with Kasco Services Corporation ("Kasco"), I
requested that Connie include butcher supplies as part of the newly acquired Tri-BSupply business license in the event Tri-B-Supply decided to sell butcher supplies. At

that point, no decision for me to leave Kasco's employment or to set up any kind of
individual business had been made
3. Approximately one week before I gave Kasco notice of my decision to resign
from employment, I became extremely frustrated and dissatisfied with Kasco as an
employer.

This was due in large part to the fact that they would not return my

telephone calls nor would they listen to my concerns for the business. I began voicing
my desire to leave the business with the hope that Kasco would contact me so that we
could work out my concerns and I would stay in the business. I was careful not to do
or say anything which would alienate customers in the event that I remained at Kasco.
4. During this entire period, prior to my resignation, I was careful only to indicate
to customers that I was leaving Kasco. I did not mention anything about starting my
own business.
5. On February 15, 1989, I tendered my resignation effective March 1, 1989.
After the effective date of my resignation in March of 1989, I made a few orders for
butcher supplies.
6. In order to expand Tri-B-Supply in both ceramics and future butcher supplies,
Connie and I obtained a $30,000.00 line of credit from the bank using our jointly owned
residence as security. We also used our jointly owned personal savings and our stock
to provide capital for Tri-B-Supply.
7. After the effective date of my resignation on March 1, 1989, I made some
small orders for butcher supplies.
8. After the Temporary Restraining Order was served on March 18, 1989, I made
no purchases or orders for purchases of butcher supplies.
9. Since the Temporary Restraining Order was filed against me on March 18,
1989, I have done nothing to be involved with Tri-B-Supply butcher supply business. I

have acted as the court instructed "as Mr. Mom" and have only been involved in the
marketing of ceramics.
10. I have not even been significantly involved in answering the telephone for the
business.

Connie obtained the services of Anna Benson to answer the telephone.

Occasionally, when Connie and Anna were out, for example, to get the mail, I would
answer the telephone and would receive a call asking for butcher supplies. I would
always indicate that I was restrained and could not service them but that Connie or
Robert would be back with them shortly. My ceramics business is in the same building
as Connies and Kasco asserts that I tried to communicate to Connie by giving her dirty
looks.

I recall only once when I gave Connie a dirty look when she answered the

telephone. That occasion was not intentional. We have not communicated through dirty
looks.
11. My intent was never to communicate any information regarding the butcher
supply business to Connie, and in fact, I have never intentionally communicated any
information regarding the business to her since the Restraining Order.
12. On May 1, 1989, I underwent surgery to remove the L-5 disk from my back
because of severe nerve damage and degeneration to the disk. From that date until
present, I have been totally disabled.

I have been unable to work and have been

collecting disability and unemployment compensation. The doctors have indicated to me
that I am in need of another operation but they have chosen not to operate to remove
the scar tissue because the scar tissue is located too close to the nerve and an operation
may render me paralyzed. In fact, I am not even able to participate in therapy but I
have been receiving periodical epidural injections of steroids and cortisone.

13. Robert Benson lives in his own household and was never involved with me
in Tri-B-Supply nor have I in any way communicated with him in regard to the business,
any information that he may have, he has learned independent from me.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.
DATED this /jL-day of January, 1990.

Lafry Bensdn-—^
Subscribed and acknowledged before me

-Notaiy Public
My commission expires:

day of January, 1990.

*-"'-

Residing at:

/ u
MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that on the Is

day of January, 1990, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Affidavit of Defendant Larry Benson was mailed first class, postage
prepaid to the following:
Michael F. Richman
David L. Arlington
Casey K. McGarvey
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84145
,_
)

kk\rt\bensonl.aff
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Reid Tateoka (3193)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
KASCO SERVICES CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE
BENSON

:

Civil No. 89-0901724

vs.
LARRY D. BENSON,
CONNIE A. BENSON
dba TRI-B-SUPPLY,

Judge David S. Young
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:

)
:ss.
)

Connie Benson, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and states as follows:
1. I am a defendant in the above-entitled matter and as such have personal
knowledge of all facts contained herein.
2.

After Larry Benson had been restrained on March 22, 1989, I had no

conversations with him regarding any phase of the butcher supply portion of the business
of Tri-B-Supply. I have not talked to him regarding pricing, purchases, supplies, routes
or in any other way.
3. All purchases for Tri-B-Supply have been paid for by me with checks written
by me personally, drawn upon my Tri-B-Supply bank account, (in which Larry had no
check writing privileges after the Preliminary Injunction) on my funds.

4. On March 10, 1989, prior to the Restraining Order, I sent a letter to potential
customers, who I found in the telephone book, informing them that Tri-B-Supply was
beginning a butcher supply business.
5. Kasco Services Corporation ("Kasco") asserts that its customers requested that
Kasco remove their equipment after I sent my March 10th letter. This is not true. I
talked to the people who Kasco named in their salesman's affidavit. Anyone who made
such a request was making idle threats which were never carried out. Those who were
requesting equipment to be removed were not authorized to make those statements in
behalf of their company. The various meat departments would not be able to operate
if equipment were removed and these people were not in a position to ask for equipment
to be removed prior to having substituted equipment placed in the stores. I did not
supply any of the stores any equipment and Tri-B-Supply did not supply equipment to
those stores that Plaintiff asserts have previously asked that their equipment to be
removed because of Tri-B-Supply beginning a business. Sales were not lost by Kasco as
previously asserted in their salesman's affidavits.
6. On March 18, 1989, a Temporary Restraining Order was filed against me and
my husband Larry.

On the Hearing on March 21, 1989, Preliminary Injunction was

issued against Larry only. The Court indicated that I was not restrained.
7.

I personally re-registered Tri-B-Supply under my own name with Robert

Benson as sales and service representative. Any affiliation that Larry Benson had with
the business was terminated at the time of the Preliminary Injunction.

Larry has no

interest in the business nor is he allowed to have any input into the butcher supply
business. He has not shared in the profits of Tri-B-Supply.
8.

In order to conduct my business, not knowing anything about the butcher

supply business, I went to a friend of mine, Dan Huwa, to ask him for help in training

me and my son, Robert Benson, to run the business. We spent time with Dan Huwa
being trained on how to repair parts and how to set up our business. I paid for the
training primarily from my Master Card and from my joint bank account. I also had
discussions with Huwa and with various distributors on proper pricing for products and
as a result of the training by Huwa and my discussions with the different distributors I
was able to set up pricing for product.
9. In order to prevent any confusion in the business that Larry Benson might still
be in the business, I sent out a letter to all potential known customers stating that Larry
Benson had been restrained and would not be involved in the Tri-B-Supply business and
that Robert and I would operating the business.
10.

In order to insure that Larry would not be involved in the business, I

obtained the services of Anna Benson to answer telephones so that Larry would not even
be involved in any contact with butcher supply customers.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.
DATED this J^

day of January, 1990.
y

""Connie Benson
Subscribed and acknowledged before me this

*'Q&
/V^^clay
of January, 1990.

^otal^Public
Myxommission expires:
<

\

Residing at:
,

7

•

_/"'

•

,-

-

,

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that on the /,^r day of January, 1990, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Affidavit of Defendant Connie Benson was mailed first class, postage
prepaid to the following:
Michael F. Richman
David L. Arrington
Casey K. McGarvey
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
,
¥>2t2fc^
kk\rt\bensonc.aff
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL

2

DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4
5
6

KASCO SERVICES CORPORATION,

PLAINTIFF,

7

-VS-

8
9

LARRY D. BENSON & CONNIE
A. BENSON, ET AL,

)

)

CIVIL NO. C-89-1724

)

JUDGE'S RULING

)

10
11

DEFENDANTS

12
13
14
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON TUESDAY, THE 21ST DAY

15
16

OF MARCH, 1 9 8 9 , COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 3 : 3 0

17

P.M.,

18

COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

19

LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF „TAK;

20

HONORABLE DAVID S .

21

DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH.

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE
IN AND FOR S^LT

SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE

YOUNo, JUDGE IN THE THIRD

22
23
24
25

O'CLOCK

tXHibii L

JUDICIAL

1|

A P F L A R A N C E S

2
3 |

FOR THE P L A I N T I F F :

MICHAEL f . RICHMAN &
DAVID L . ARRINGTON
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
MC CARTHY
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH
84101

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

REID TATEOKA
MC KAY, BURTON & THURMAN
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
KENNECOTT BUILDING #1200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 413 3

4 |
5 |

6
7 |
8 |
9 |
10
,,

I

A *

,

12
13
14 |

I N D E X

15
16 I

MR. RICHMAN'S

17 I

JUDGE'S RULING

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

REPLY

PAGE 3

PAGE 5

P_ R C C E E D_ 1_ N G S_
MR. RICHMAN:

iOUR HONOk, BEFORE THE COURT RULES, TWO

CASES CAME UP DURING THE ARGUMENT.

ONE REFERENCED BY THE

COURT, THE MUNA CASE, AND THE OTHER, FINLAY CASE, REFERENCED
BY OPPOSING COUNSEL.

MAY I HAVE JUST ONE MOMENT TO COMMENT

ON THOSE?
JUDGE YOUNG:

YOU MAY.

MR. RICHMAN:

OKAY.

YOUR HONOR, 1 SUGGEST THE MUNA

CASE, IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE, HAS NO APPLICATION
WHATSOEVER.

AND THE REASON IS THAT IN THE MUNA CASE WE

WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT THAT WAS SOUGHT)
TO BE ENFORCED OR, AT LEAST, WITH RESPECT TO THE MUNA CASE
THE COURT FOUND THAT A '68 RESTRICTIVE COVENANT WAS LATER
REPLACED BY A CONTRACT SIGNED IN 1978 BY DR. MUNA THAT DID
NOT CONTAIN THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT.

SO WE WERE NOT TALKING^

ABOUT A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN THAT PARTICULAR CASE.

WHAT

THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT IS THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT A TRADE
SECRET WITH RESPECT TO THE PROCESS THAT DETECTS HERPES AND
THIS OTHER STUFF.

SC THEY WERE GOING UNDER THE COMMON LAW

TRADE SECRET NOT A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT.

AND WITH RESPECT

TO THE COMMON LAW TRADE SECRET THEY FOUND DR. MUNA, IN 1966,
HAD PUBLISHED AN ART-iCLL AS TO HOW IN THE WORLD YOU MAKE
THIS PARTICULAR TEST.
AND LASTLY, ON PAGE 7 00, WITH REFERENCE TO THE
CUSTOMER LISTS, THE COURT'S CITING A NEW YORK CASE OF

Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R.

3

1
SILFEN, INC. V. CREAM IN THE SECOND COLUMN.

"IN THE ABSENCE

OF AN EXPRESS AGREEMENT TO THAT Lir FECT BETWEEN THE PARTIES,
OR A DEMONSTRATION THAT A CUSTOMER LIST HAS THE SEVERAL
ATTRIBUTES OF A TRADE SECRET."
IN THIS CASE WE DO HAVE AN AGREEMENT BY THE
PARTIES THAT IS A TRADE SECRET.

UNDER THE RESTRICTIVE

COVENANT WE HAVE THAT AGREEMENT SO THE MUNA CASE, IN ALL
DUE RESPECT TO THE COURT, AND I'M NOT SURE THE COURT WAS
SAYING IT WAS APPLICABLEJUDGE YOUNG:
IT IS INAPPLICABLE.

I DO DISAGREE WITH YOUR FEELING THAT
I THINK IT IS APPLICABLE BUT I

UNDERSTAND YOUk ARGUrtL::'. .
MR. RICHMAN:

OKA*.

ALSO WITH RESPECT' TO THE ROBBINS

V. FINLAY CASE WHICH WE HAD NOT HEAD, THE DEFENDANT IN THAT
CASE WAS ONE OF SEVERAL SALESMEN THAT SAT INSIDE A HEARING
CLINIC WHERE A LOT OF PEOPLE CAME.
SALESMAN TYPE THAT MR. BENSON IS.

HE WAS NOT THE TRAVELING
BUT THE MOST APPLICABLE

PORTION OF THIS CASE APPEARS ON PAGE 627 AT THE LAST
PARAGRAPH ON THE PAGE WHICH I BELIEVE WE UNDERLINED FOR
THE COURT.

THAT SAYS, "TTiS CASE IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM

ALLEN V. ROSE PARK," WhiCH )S IN OUR FAVOR, "WHERE THE
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE rih- ENFORCED BECAUSE ALL OF THE
GOODWILL OF THE EMPLOYER WAS ASSOCIATED WITH, AND CREATED
BY, THE EMPLOYEE," WHICH IS THE SITUATION WE HAVE HERE.
ALL OF THE GOODWILL IS CREATED BY--

A

1

JUDGE YOUNG:

I HAVE HEAD THE ALLEN CASE RECENTLY.

2

MR. RICHMAN:

OKAY.

ALSO, CONTINUING ON THAT PARAGRAPH

3

THE COURT SAID, "NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT HIS

4

COMPETITION

5

GREATER EFFECT ON PLAINTIFF'S GOODWILL, OR OTHER LEGALLY

$

PROTECTABLE INTEREST, THAN THE COMPETITON OF ANY OTHER

7

SALESMAN EMPLOYED BY A COMPETITOR."

8
9

(EXCEPT FOR THE USE OF CUSTOMER LEADS) HAD ANY

WELL, WE KNOW THAT'S NOT TRUE IN THIS PARTICULAR
CASE.

WE KNOW IT ALREADY FROM THE AFFIDAVITS WHICH REFLECT

10

THAT MR. MOSS IS ABOUT TO GIVE 70 STORES TO MR. BENSON.

11

MR. BENSON HAS AN UNBELIEVABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OVER

12

US THAT IS NOT ATTENDANT TO SOME OTHER COMPETITOR IN THE

13

INDUSTRY.

14

PROPER TO--

15

JUDGE YOUNG:

16

17

AND BASED ON THAT WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE

THANK YOU,

MR. TATEOKA,

MR.

RICHMAN.

DO YOU WISH TO ADDRESS ANY OF THE

CASES?

18

MR. TATEOKA:

NO, YOUR HONOR, WE WILL REST.

19

JUDGE YOUNG:

ALL RIGHT.

THE COURT HAS REVIEWED THE

20

CASES, MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORP. V. MUNA, AND IN

21

REFERENCE TO YOUR COMMENTS, MR. KICHMAN, I DO DISAGREE IN

22

RELATION TO THE APPLICATION OF THE ISSUE OF THE CUSTOMER

23

LISTS, CUSTOMER INFORMATICS THAT I BELIEVE THAT MR. BENSON

24

DID HAVE PRIOR TO THE EMPLOYMENT WITH KASCO AND KEEN THERE

25

BEFORE.

HOWEVER, 1 DO BELIEVE THAT THE SYSTEMS CONCEPT CASE,!

1

HAVING REVIEWED THAT AGAIN, APPLIES DIRECTLY TO THIS CASE.

2

AND I ' D

3

RELATION TO THAT.

LIKE TO JUST COMMENT CM A COUPLE OF THINGS IN

!

4

THE COUKT THEREIN STATED, JUSTICE HOWE STATED,

5

THAT INJUNCTION I S AN EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY AND SHOULD NOT

6

BE LIGHTLY GRANTED AND STATED FURTHER THAT IT I S WELL-SETTLEDJ

7

THAT THE GRANTING OR REFUSING OF INJUNCTION RESTS TO SOME

8

EXTENT WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT,

9

THEREFORE, EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES SEEM TO BE APPROPRIATE TO

10

RELY ON IN RELATION TO THE GRANTING OF AN INJUNCTION.

11

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF ALLEN

12

V.

ROSE PARK PHARMACY, THEY BEING NUMBER ONE, THAT THE

13

COVENANT MUST BE SUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION.

14

REQUIREMENT I S MET.

15

THAT

NUMBER TWO, THAT NO BAD FAITH BE SHOWN IN THE

16

NEGOTIATIONS OF THE CONTRACT.

17

THOUGH SOME DID NOT WISH TO SIGN THE CONTRACT UNDER THE

18

CIRCUMSTANCES OF ITS PRESENTATION, THAT REQUIREMENT ALSO

19

WAS MET.

20

I BELIEVE,

LIKEWISE,

EVEN

NUMBER THREE, THE COVENANT BE NECESSARY TO PROTECT!

21

THE GOODWILL OF THE BUSINESS AND,- NUMBER FOUR, THAT IT BE

11

REASONABLE IN ITS RESTRICTIONS IN TERMS OF TIME AND AREA.

23

I BELIEVE EACH OF THOSE REQUIREMENTS IS MET IN THIS CONTRACT

24

AND THUS THE PRELIMINARY

25

HOWEVER, THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION—THIS CASE NEEDS TO BE

Eileen

M. A m b r o s e ,

C.S.R

INJUNCTION WILL BE GRANTED.

EXPEDITIOUSLY HANDLED AND I SUSPECT IT WILL BE.

THE

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WILL BE GRANTED T(; EXPIRE 18 MONTHS
FROM AUGUST, 1988 BECAUSE I BELIEVE A'l THAT TIME THE COMPANY
WAS ON NOTICE THAT MR. BENSON DID NOT WISH TO RETAIN ANY
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS iN HIS EMPLOYMENT, THEREAFTER, THE
COMPANY WOULD BE WILLING TO EITHER--REQUI RED TO TERMINATE
HIM OR DEAL OTHERWISE WITH HIM.

AT THAT POINT THE

RESTRICTIVE COVENANT WOULD BE TERMINATED AS TO ITS
APPLICATION TO MR. BENSON EXCEPT FOR 18 MONTHS THEREAFTER.
NOW, I THINK MR. TATEOKA'S ORIGINAL POSITION
IN RELATION TO MRS. BENSON IS WELL-TAKEN.

AND YOU

FUNDAMENTALLY HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENFORCE ANYTHING AS TO MRS.
BENSON IN RELATION TO THiS .AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, IT'S OBVIOUS
TO THE COURT THAT UNLESS MR. BENSON IS ENJOINED FROM
COMMUNICATING OR SHARING ANY OF THE INFORMATI UN THAT HE
WOULD HAVE RECEIVED AS AN EMPLOYEE OF KEEN AND THEREAFTER
KASCO VTTH MRS. BENSON THAT THE AFFECT OF AN INJUNCTION,
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, WOULD BE NEUTRALIZED, AND THUS,
MR- BENSON IS ENJOINED FROM COMMUNICATING ANY INFORMATION
IN THIS RELATION TO MRS. BENSON.
MR. RICHMAN:

i WOULD ASSUME, YOUR HONOR, THAT

THIS ORDER WOULD ALSO SL .APPLICABLE TO TRI-3 SUPPLY OF WHICH
MR. BENSON IS AN OWNER.
JUDGE YOUNG:

THE Of.DER WOULD APPLY TO T K I - B

MR. TATEOKA:

YOUR HONOR,

Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R.

COULD

YOU CLARIFY

SUPPLY.
FOR ME WHAT

7

MR. BENSON

IS

NOT ALLOW;:'.' TO DC?

WHEN YOU cAY

ALLOWED TO COMMUNICATE Wl'L'.-i MRS.

BENSON T H A T ' S

AND I SUSPECT THAT

WHAT YOU ' kE SAYING

TO COMMUNICATE CUSTOMER L I S T S ,
COMMUNICATE S U P P I E S ,

BUT

HE'S

KIND OF BROAD.,
NOT ALLOWED

NOT ALLOWED TO

I SUSPECT AS TO TRAINING

HOW TO APPROACH CUSTOMERS,
OPPOSED TO THE OTHER,

HE'S

IS

HE I S NOT

METHODS,

WHAT THE BENEFITS ONE SAW AS

I SUSPECT THAT'S COMMON KNOWLEDGE I

SUPPOSE HE CAN COMMUNICATE.
JUDGE YOUNG:

IF

IT DETERMINED BY THE COURT THAT THE

OBJECTIVE OF THE PARTIES

I S TO ATTEMPT,

BENSON WHO HAS NEVER CALLED ON ANYONE,
GO AROUND THE COURT'S
I

SHE HASN'T

AND A GUISE TO AVOID THE
IN DISHARMONY

THE PROVISIONS

AND THEREAFTER
AND THAT MR.

TATEOKA,

I DON'T 3EL1EVE THAT THAT'S j

".'HAT I S UTILIZED

P"SPONS1BIL

AS A RUSE

ITY OF THE CONTRACT

WITH Mi RULING.

THE RULING

OF THE AGREEMENT THAT APPLY TO

AS TO THE COVENANT

MR.

BEEN A PREVIOUS EMPLOYEE SO FAR AS

I ' V E BEEN ABLE TO SEE AND I:

THAT I S

MRS.

AS AN EMPLOYEE, TO

ORDER, THEN OBVIOUSLY,

WILL NOT BE HAPPY ABOUT THAT.

MY D E S I R E .

BY U T I L I Z I N G

I S THAT

RESTRICTIONS

NOT TO COMPETE IN RELATION TO THE KEEN,

KASCO CONTRACT, ARE ENFORCEABLE AND VALID

BENSON

IS

EXPECTED TO MAKE A GOOD FAITH

EFFORT

TO COMPLY WITH THOSE AND TO SEE THAT HIS A S S I S T A N C E ,
COMMUNICATION,
BE,

WITH MRS.

RULING.

Eileen

ALL

M.

CONTACT,
BENSON,

CONVERSATION,

WHATEVER ELSE

MAINTAINS THE S P I R I T

OF THE

\
IT MAY

COURT'S

RIGHT?

Ambrose,

C.S.R.

8

MR. RICHMAN, WOULD YOU PREPARE AN ORDER?
MR. RICHMAN:

YES, VOL b HONOR.

I WOULL» ASSUME THAT

THIS COURT'S ORDER I S NOT PRECLUDING US FROM SEEKING A
PERMANENT INJUNCTION AGAINST MRS. BENSON AT A LATER TIME,
JUST A DENIAL AT THIS TIME.
JUDGE YOUNG:

WELL,

1 DON'T SEE THAT I HAVE ANY BASIS

FOR HAVING JURISDICTION OVER HER IN RELATION TO A CONTRACT
AT ALL.
MR. RICHMAN:

WELL, ONLY TO THE EXTENT, YOUR HONOR,

THAT WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE NATURE OF T R I - B SUPPLY
IT APPEARS TO BE A PARTNERSHIP

IS.

IN THAT I T ' S MR. AND MRS.

BENSON OPERATING UNDER THE NAME OF T R I - B SUPPLY FOR PROFIT,
AND THAT WOULD NORMALLY, IF TWO PEOPLE ARE OPERATING FOR
PROFIT

IT WOULD NORMALLY BE A PARTNERSHIP.

I ASSUME THE

COURT'S ORDER MEANS THAT MRS. B""SON CAN GO OUT AND SOLICIT
ALL SHE WANTS SO LONG AS SHE DOESN'T USE THE INFORMATION
FROM MR. BENSON BUT SHE 1£ GOING TO HAVE TO DO THE WORK
HERSELF, MR. BENSON CAN'T BE OUT THERE DOING THAT WORK.
JUDGE YOUNG:

THAT IS RIGHT.

MR. BENSON IS MR. MOM.

MR. RICHMAN:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

WE'LL PREPARE

THE ORDER.
YOUR, WITH RESPECT TO A BOND, I KNOW THE COURT
HASN'T SAID ANYTHING BUT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO PUT UP A
BOND ON T H I S .
JUDGE YOUNG:

Eileen

M. A m b r o s e ,

ALL RIGHT.

C.S.R.

A COST BOND IN RELATION TO

9

COVERAGE OF WHAT COSTS?

I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF COUNSEL

FOR EITHER SIDE COULD GIVK ME Mi ESTIMATE.
MR. RICHMAN:

YOUR HONOR, 1 THINK IT'S MORE THAN COSTS,

I WOULD THINK, SINCE, PERHAPS, WE ARE EFFECTIVELY PUTTING
MR. BENSON OUT OF BUSINESS THAT WE SHOULD BE PUTTING UP A
BOND OF SOME SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT.

AND I WOULD SUGGEST $5 0,00CJ

IS A SUFFICIENT BOND INASMUCH AS HE WAS MAKING 65,000 A
YEAR, SIX MONTHS HAS ALREADY BEEN KNOCKED OFF.
JUDGE YOUNG:

AND WE HAVE 18 MONTHS.

MR. RICHMAN:

YES.

MR. TATEOKA:

I WOULD SUSPECT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A

YEAR'S WORTH OF HIS SALARY WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

JUDGE YOUNG:

BOND I.i iHL AMOUNT OF $50,000.

MR. TATEOKA:

YOUR HONOR, WITH REGARD TO T R I - B I GUESS

I HAVE A CONCERN I F MRS. BENSON IS GOING TO GO OUT AND BE
THE BREADWINNER FROM NOW ON AND GO OUT AND DO THE SALES.
WE'D LIKE TO BE ABLE TO DO THAT UNDER THE NAME T R I - B .
MEAN, SHE'S OPERATED THAT BUSINESS.

I

AND I SUSPECT THAT

AS LONG AS HE'S RESTRAINS.? 'I HAT TAKES CARE OF THEIR CONCERN
AND SHE STILL OUGHT TO EL ABLE '10 OPERATE UNDER T R I - B .
JUDGE YOUNG:

UNDER .HE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF THAT

ORGANIZATION THE INJUNCTION A P P L I E S .
I S WHAT I HAVE AT P R E S E N i .
MR. TATEOKA:

WELL,

ALL I CAN DEAL WITH

I S THAT CLEAR?

I T H I N K - - I THOUGHT THE INJUNCTION

WAS AS AGAINST T R I - B AND MR. BENSON.

Eileen

M. A m b r o s e ,

C.S.R.

10

JUDGE YOUNG:
INDICATES

MR.

IT

BENSON

IS.
IS

PRESENT

STRUCTURE OF T R I - B

AN OWNER IN T R I - B .

COURT'S

IN

RECESS.
(WHEREUPON,

THL JUDGE'S

*

E i l e e n M. A m b r o s e ,

C.S.R.

*

RULING WAS CONCLUDED)

*

11

If

C E R T I !:' I C A T L

2
3 ! STATE OF UTAH
:

SS

4 | COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

5
6 1

I,

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I

7

AM A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH;

8

THAT AS SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER,

9

THE HEARING OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME

I ATTENDED

10

AND PLACE SET OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT i TOOK DOWN IN

11

SHORTHAND THE TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD

12

THEREIN; AND THAT THEREAFTER 1 TRANSCRIBED MY SAID

13

SHORTHAND NOTES INTO TYPEWRITING., AND THAT THE FOREGOING

H

TRANSCRIPTION

IS A FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION

15 | OF THE SAME.

16
17
18
EILEEN H.j AMBROSE, C.'S.R.
19
20
21
22
23

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
JANUARY 14TH,

199 2.

24
25

E i l e e n M. A m b r o s e ,

C.S.R.

12

TabF

Dear Friend,
This is to inform you that Larry Benson has a Restraining
Order against him and cannot service in the area for the period
of 1 year.
However I would like to inform you that I am operating with
my son Robert L. Benson, who is very capable of handling your
service needs u u^crdte our new business.
Robert has been trained by Huwa Sales & Service in Denver,
Colo, and is recently being trained by Atlanta Saw Co. in
Georgia, to do your service of Grinder Plates & Knives and Saw
Blades and the repair of Grinders, Saws, Slicers, and
Tenderizers.
He is presently being trained to handle service and repair
of Patty Machines and Heat Seal Stations -excluding Scales.
We solicit your business and will be contacting you about
our very exciting service program.
Thank you very much.
Sincerely,

Connie A. Benson
Robert L. Benson

TabG

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL

DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KASCO SERVICES C O R P . ,
PLAINTIFF,

CIVIL NO.

-VS-

C-89-0901724

JUDGE'S RULING

LARRY BENSON,
DEFENDANT.

•k

-k

-k

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THURSDAY, THE 5TH DAY
OF APRIL,

1990,

COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9 : 5 5

O'CLOCK

A . M . , THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T ,

IN AND FOR SALT

LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE
HONORABLE DAVID S .

YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL

DISTRICT COURT, STATE Or UTAH.

1

A P t>

A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

DAVID L. ARRINGTON,
MICHAEL F. RICHMON
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL £
MC CARTHY
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SUITE #1600
P.O. BOX 45340
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145

FOR THE DEFENDANT

REID TATEOKA
MC KAY, BURTON & THURMAN
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* * *

p h. v. v__ L ^ o_ 1_ N_ 3_ S_
JUDGE YOUNG:

ALL R I G H T .

LET ME I N D I C A T E TO

MR. A R R I N G T O N , THAT

I APPRECIATE

THE ARGUMENT

TATLOKA.

OF M R .

YOUR A R G U M E N T ; 1 A P P R E C I A T E

I HAVE B E E N , FROM T H E B E G I N N I N G
VERY CONCERNED

EFFORT

IN 1 9 8 2 .

T H E BEST

CASE,
AROSE

INFORMATION THAT

T O ME N O W IS THAT T H E R E HAS BEEN M A D E AN

BY M R . B E N S O N T O A B I D E BY T H E T E R M S AND

OF T H E R E S T R I C T I V E C O V E N A N T , C O N S I S T E N T
RULING THAT

OF

I ASSUME WOULD

I HAVE
EXCELLENT

CONDITIONS

WITH THE

HE A B I D E BY T H O S E FROM AUGUST

18 M O N T H S T H E R E A F T E R , WHICH
OF

OF T H I S

ABOUT THIS CONTRACT PROVISION THAT

IN T H E C O N T R A C T
AVAILABLE

YOU,

COURT'S

1988 U N T I L -

BE ABOUT

MARCH

1990.
BASED THEN

THE RECORD THAT

I'VE

UPON T H E A R G U M E N T T H A T

I'VE

BEEN A B L E TO O B S E R V E AND MY

C O N C E R N T H A T W E ' R E NOT P L A Y I N G

HEARD,
CONTINUING

ON AN EVEN P L A Y I N G

FIELD

WITH PEOPLE WHO HAVE CONSISTENT POWER H E R E , I WILL TELL
VERY CANDIDLY AND VERY FRANKLY THAT
AS TO THE EXTENT
LITIGATION.
THE TRIAL

AT WHICH

IN R E L A T I O N TO THE D A M A G E S AND
IN R E L A T I O N TO

AT S O M E L A T E R T I M E .

CUSTOMERS

KASCO HAS C O N T I N U E D

CONCERNS

THIS

A N D T H O S E C O N C E R N S WOULD BE D E V E L O P E D

ANY DECISION

R E A S O N WHY

I HAVE S O M E

BUI

K A S C O COULD

THAT AND MUST

I WILL

RESERVE

.H^RL SEEMS TO ME TO BE

KAPiD

THROUGH

RESERVE
IT

SCHEDULE THAN THEY

UNTIL

LITTLE

NOT ALSO BE C O V E R I N G A L L OF

E V E N ON A MORL

YOU

THOSE
DID B E F O R E J
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AS I UNDERSTAND, THESE A.-,:•. UJKAL PEOPLE, PRINCIPALLY, AND
SMALL TOWNS, WHERE THERE'S NOT GOING TO BE A WHOLE LOT OF
BUTCHER SHOPS IN SMALL TOWNS FOR BUTCHER SUPPLIES AND ALL
THAT KASCO HAS TO DO IS TO CONTINUE OR TO BEGIN TO CREATE
THE GOOD WILL THAT YOU CLAIM IS SO INHERENT IN LARRY BENSON
WHO HAS NOT EVEN BEEN ABLE TO CALL ON THESE PEOPLE FOR 18
MONTHS.
BASED UPON THESE CONCERNS THAT I HAVE AS TO THE
AGREEMENT, THE MOTION TO MODIFY THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
IS DENIED; THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT IS DENIED,
AND THE MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AS TO CONNIE
AND ROBERT BENSON IS DENIED.
MR. TATEOKA, WILL YOU PREPARE THE ORDER?
MR. TATEOKA:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

JUDGE YOUNG:

ALL RIGHT.

COURT'S IN RECESS.

(WHEREUPON, THE JUDGE'S RULING WAS CONCLUDED).
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Tab I

Reid Tateoka (3193)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendants
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

I

KASCO SERVICES CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT BENSON
Civil No.

890901724

•j LARRY D. BENSON and
CONNIE A. BENSON, dba
TRI-B-SUPPLY,
Defendants
:

l

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss

Robert Benson, being first duly sworn upon his oath,
deposes and states as follows:
!i

ji

1.

I am the son of Larry D. Benson and Connie Benson

iland am an employee of Tri-B-Supply and as such have personal
ilknowledged of all facts contained herein.
|

2.1

have not lived with Larry and Connie Benson since

il SzfT/9 , 19^.
ji

|!
;

3.1

have no employment agreement with Kasco nor have I

>ever been an employee or agent of Kasco.

4.

I have had no contact with Kasco, have not seen

i

1

Kasco!s customer list nor any proprietary information of Kasco
and I am not aware of any of its business policies or information.
5.

As of April 28, 1989, I was an employee of

Tri-B-Supply.
6.

I am paid a bi-weekly salary from which Tri-B-Supply

pays appropriate withholding tax and other obligations.
7.

I have no input on business decisions or do I have a

choice of who the suppliers should be.
8.

I supplied no money or capital investment to the

business.
9.

I was not involved in any decision to start the

business.
10.

I received all of my training on how to service

customers through Huwa Sales in Denver, Colorado.
11.

I have never received training in any part of the

business with Larry Benson.
12.

I have had no discussions with Larry Benson with

regard to the business from which Larry has been restrained.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT
DATED this

day of September, 1989.

jW/Jb^r
jj
If

Robert -Betison

Subscribed and acknowledged before me this
September, 1989.
/ ^\
v
Notary Public

day of

^~

Residing at:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that on the £/?f_ day of September,
•

!

;I 1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit was
Ii

!,mailed first class, postage prepaid to the following:
lr
\)
;!
i|
•\\
i
!j

i!

Michael F. Richman
David L. Arrington
Casey K. McGarvey
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main street
Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 8414-5

(

OX,

'•\
i

"v

;

II
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Tab J

Reid Tateoka (Bar No. 3193)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
12 00 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KASCO SERVICES CORPORATION,
AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY D.
BENSON IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR MODIFICATION

Plaintiff,
v.
LARRY D. BENSON and CONNIE A.
BENSON dba TRI-B-SUPPLY,

Civil No. 89-0901724
Honorable David S. Young

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Larry D. Benson, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

He is the defendant in the above-entitled matter and as

such has personal knowledge of all facts contained herein.
2.

I became employed by Keene Corporation in approximately

January, 1977.

Some time on or about August, 1978, I was given a

portion of an employment contract by Keene.

I was not given any

additional compensation, or additional benefits for signing the
portion of the employment contract with Keene.

3.

I have never deemed the Keene employment contract as a

valid contract as the copy of the portion of the agreement which
I was given to sign is not the agreement plaintiff attaches to his
memorandum as Exhibit "A".
4.

At the time I was given the Keene agreement to sign, it

did not contain all of the pages which plaintiff has attached to
its memorandum as Exhibit "A".
5.

I never executed an employment agreement with KASCO.

6.

In August, 1988, Kasco presented me a copy of their

employment agreement, including a non-compete clause.
7.

Kasco indicated to me that I must agree to the non-

compete agreement in the Kasco employment contract or that I would
be terminated.

I also received a policy letter confirming that I

was required to sign Kasco's employment contract with its noncompete agreement as a condition of employment.

A copy of said

letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof.
8.

I told Kasco's representative, Jim Gingerich, that I

would not sign the non-compete agreement.

Mr. Gingerich told me

that Kasco indicated to him that they would terminate everyone who
would not sign the employment agreement containing the non-compete
clause.

I made it clear to Kasco that I would not continue

employment under the non-compete agreement and that I deemed the
non-compete agreement null and void from that point.
2

9.

Following the Court's restraining order and preliminary

injunction, I have not been involved in the business of Tri-B
Supply in any way.

I have not contacted any customers nor have I

given any Tri-B customers or any potential customers any information with regard to butcher supply.

On occasion, I have received

a telephone call or two from potential customers or they have
talked to me at church or at some other public place where I
happened to be.

In each instance, I indicated to them that I was

restrained, that I could not talk to them regarding the butcher
supply business for the period of the preliminary injunction order.
10.

I have never told anyone that I would be coming back to

work in the butcher supply business.
11.

I cannot help what others think with regard to my running

the business or my coming back. However, I can unequivocally state
that I have said nothing intentionally to try to lead them to
believe that I was running the business, which I am not.

I have

said nothing to lead Tri-B clients or potential Tri-B clients to
believe that I am in any way connected with the business.

I have

had no conversations with Robert Benson or with Connie Benson in
any way, nor have I communicated in any knowing way regarding the
butcher supply business. Since the restraining- order and preliminary injunction, I have done all which I am physically capable of

3

doing to insure that I keep the spirit and intent as well actual
mandate of the preliminary injunction.
12.

After termination with Kasco, I have never been out in

the field nor actively soliciting without Kasco's permission.

I

was not involved in drafting or sending the letters that went out
to potential customers.

I have heard Connie Benson testify that

she was the one who prepared and sent out any letters.
13.

No Kasco information was ever given to Connie.

As soon

as I terminated my employment I gave all materials back to Kasco,
including all customer lists, policy manuals and anything I had in
my possession.
personnel

I have never introduced Connie or Bob to any

at different stores7 butcher shops.

I have never

indicated to Connie in any way who she was to send letters to.

I

have not provided Connie or Robert any information with regard to
pricing or contacting customers.
14.

Presently,

I

do

not

know

anything

about

Connie's

business, what her pricing is, who her customers are, except as
Kasco has enlightened me through depositions and other information
in this lawsuit.
15.

I was physically disabled as of May 1, 1989 when I

underwent back surgery and have been physically unable to be
involved in a butcher supply business such as Tri-B event if I
would have wanted to.
4

DATED this ^f)

STATE OF UTAH

day of January, 1990,

)

ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of January,

1990.
/

">

..V~^
Notary Public
My C6mmissToriSExpires:
•-: /

y'
,_,

i/<%J

w\misc\bensbn.aff

Residing at:

s

^^,
/

• .'"
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KASCO
Policy
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SUBJECT

TERRITORY MANAGER
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

EFFECTIVE

OlSTRioUllON

AL1

Continuing
REVISES

AFFECTS

DATED

Territory Managers
FILE UNOERSECHON

APPROVED BY

ISSUED BY

G. Bowers

W. Sykes

As a condition of employment with KASCO Corporation, each Territory
Manager is required to enter into an agreement with the company concerning
the conditions of employment. A copy o^this ngrppmpnr •»' g arrached._
This _agreement and/or ones similar to it have been in effect for both
Keexte Cutting Services~nd Atlantic Service Company^ for many years and are
hereby restated for the record. "In addition to many other subjects, this
agreement includes provisions which state:
1)

Employment with KASCO Corporation is intended to be a full time job,
and it requires the full time efforts of its employees. It does not,
therefore, permit diversions into side no matter how little effort and
time such diversions might require. The company has a large investment
in each of its employees, and the employeefs time in the field should
be spent furthering the goals of the company to the exclusion of all
others.

2)

The company has provided the employee with access to certain confidential
information concerning its customers, products, etc., and the employee
is obligated to protect the confidentiality of this information.

3)

During his employment with the company the employee is barred from
becoming involved, directly or indirectly, in any activity which is in
competition with the services and/or products provided by the company.

4)

In the case of termination, either instigated by the company or the
employee for a period of eighteen months immediately following termination
of employment, the employee may not call upon, solicit or sell products
to any KASCO customer for the purpose of competing against the KASCO
products previously sold to KASCO customers in the employees territory.

EXHIBIT "A"

TabK

ORIGINAL
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
0O0--

KASCO SERVICES CORPORATION,
CIVIL NO. 39-0901724
Plaintiff,

LARRY D. BENSON and CONNIE A. BENSON,
DBA TRI-B-SUPPLY,

DEPOSITION OF
CRAIG M. SMART

Defendants.

0O0 —

Be it remembered that on the 30th day of June 1989 the
deposition of Craig M. Smart, produced as a witness herein at
the instance of the plaintiff, in the above-entitled action now
rending, was taken before Sharon A. Merritt, a Certified
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public, in and for the State of
Utah, at the offices of VanCott, Bagiey, Cornwall & McCarthy,
2404 Washington Boulevard, Suite 900, Ogden, Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to notice-
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1
2
3

call would have been in April of
A.

Yes, March or April.

!

89, is that correct?
I wasn't sure if we were on a

three-month or a four-month basis there.

4

Q.

Then after Larry Benson provided the special

5

service in February, the next contact you had from anybody was

6

from Connie and Robert Benson the first of April of 1989?

7

A.

8

Q.

Is that right?

9

A.

Yes, if that

10

Q.

And at the time Robert and Connie Benson came and

Urn.

—

11

provided service to you in April of 1989 do you recall any

12

conversations that you had with either of them?

13

A.

I just recall that they mentioned that they were •—

14

that they had the business now and they were coming, see if

15

they could have my business at that time.

16

their prices, which was considerably less than what I had been

17

paying for the same service.

And they tell me

18

Q.

So their prices were much better than Kasco's?

19

A.

Um-hum.

(affirmatively)

And because of that

20

reason I said, "Well, sure, you know, we'll —

21

you."

22
23

Q.

we'll go with

As you testified earlier, thatfs one of the major

factors you look at in determining who to go with?

24

A.

Um-hum.

(affirmatively)

25

Q.

Is that correct?

